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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes the evolution of United States political, economic,
and strategic interests in the Republic of Korea. A discussion on what is
the "national interest" and a framework to discuss those interests is
provided. United States political interests are discussed by examining the
highlights of Korean politics following the Second World War with a focus on
current political topics. United States economic interests are viewed in
light of the economic progress South Korea has made following the Korean
war and potential promise for the future. In discussing the strategic
interests of the United States, a regional assessment of the balance of
power is made. Special emphasis is placed on current strategic issues. This
thesis concludes: 1 ) The United States has a vital strategic interest in peace
and stability on the Korean peninsula which warrants continued security
assistance to the ROK and maintenance of U.S. military forces on the
peninsula, 2) The United States has a major economic interest in the ROK
with growing trade between the two countries and significant U.S. business
investments in South Korea, and 3) The United States has a major political
interest in continued North-South dialogue as well as a peripheral interest in
constitutional reform and human rights in the ROK.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Immediately after World War II, the major focus of American political,
economic, and strategic interests lie in Western Europe. Under the Marshall
plan, the United States began pumping billions of dollars of economic aid into
that region to prevent continued expansion of Soviet influence. Even as late
as 1 979, Richard K Soloman of the RAND Corporation observed that the Asian
region has taken a third or fourth place in a set of foreign policy priorites
now focused on European security issues, the strategic balance, and the
Middle East. 1 However, that focus has begun to change. That change is
exemplified by this statement by Admiral Robert Long, the former CINCPAC:2
"No worldwide strategy for peace and stability can be effective if it
fails to account properly for the importance of the Asia/Pacific
theater, not just from a military standpoint, but from an economic and
political standpoint as well"
This change can be further evidenced in remarks by Secretary of State
George Schultz. He stated in an address to the World Affairs Council of
Northern California that "if one wants to understand the world, one must
understand the Pacific Region" and that "as important as the region is today,
it will be more important tomorrow."3
The purpose of this thesis is to examine United States national interests
in the Repulic of Korea (ROK), first is a historical light and then as it has
manifested itself in current United States policy. However, before any
meaningful analysis of United States national interest in the Republic of
Korea, or for that matter in any country, It Is imperative that one grasps the
meaning of the term, "national interest". Therefore, in this chapter, I
examine what is meant by the "national interest" and introduce a framework
by which we can discuss the political, economic, and strategic interests of
the United States. In chapter two, I discuss early American interests and
policies on the Korean peninsula. Chapter three explores Korean politics
historically, beginning with the aftermath of the Second World War. It
details major political issues important to United States interests. These
include talks between North and South Korea, the movement for a
constitutional amendment for direct election of the president, and the issue
of human rights. Chapter four examines the economic interest of the United
States in the ROK. Following a historical look at the South Korean economy
and how South Korean companies are faring today, the future prospects of the
ROK economy and how the United States figures into that future are
described. Chapter five examines the strategic interest of the United States
in the region focusing first on the regional balance of power. Discussion
centers on the objectives of the major powers in the region and how those
objectives are being pursued. Then I examine the critical policy areas of
security assistance to the Korean peninsula and the maintenance of U.S.
military forces there. Chapter six attempts to tie together United States
political, economic, and strategic interests in the ROK and how they are
viewed in a global perspective. Furthermore, chapter six offers proposed
Asian policies for U.S. decision makers.
This thesis concludes that the United States has vital national interests
in the peace and stability in the Republic of Korea and that the United States
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should continue a close and improving relationship with the South Korean
government. With this relationship, the United States would hope to
—Counter the expanding Soviet influence in East Asia
—Lessen the possibility of conflict in the region by equalizing the
balance of power between North and South Korea.
—Benefit from increased trade between the two countries.
A. THE NATIONAL INTEREST
The "national interest" is a very elusive concept and is extremely
difficult to operational ize into definitive policies for United States'
decision-makers. Hans Morgenthau stated that United States national
interests were "the goal of developing and maintaining the United States as a
predominant power in the western hemisphere, preventing conditions in
Europe which would allow European nations to interfere in the western
hemisphere, and maintaining a balance of power in Asia."4 William P. Bundy,
claimed U.S. national interests were the "physical security of the United
States, an international environment in which the United States can survive
and prosper, and that the United States should by example and/or action
influence the spread of representative government in the world."5
These theorists differ considerably, liorgenthau tend to focus on the
physical security and economic well-being as U.S. national interests which
can easily be operational! zed in terms of a stronger military and increased
economic production and protection. Bundy, on the other hand, tends to
suggest that there is much more. I concur. American national interests
include the defense and world-wide promotion a deep-rooted value system
that has become an intrinsic part of our American heritage. James Billington
describes these values as "God and liberty: the belief in an objective moral
order within a created universe on the one hand, and in the subjective right
individual choice and fulfillment on the other."6 Billington believes the
dynamic conflict between these two beliefs combine to create a pluralistic
democracy that believes in a higher authority yet diffuses power and
tolerates diversity. However, it is this pluralistic democracy itself that
poses a major impediment to the formulation of coherent foreign policy. A
pluralistic democracy, unlike that of totalitarian or authoritarian regimes,
allow a national debate among all the diverse interest groups as to what
constitutes its national interest. This debate is a long, slow, arduous
process. Moreover, a national concensus of what are the near-term or
instrumental goals for the United States is a near impossible task. In the
midst of this debate, elected officials of the United States, supported by
their constituency, put together policy which they feel best serves our
national interest. Without fail, some policies will be short-sighted and will
serve only to further fuel the national debate. Nevertheless, pluralistic
debate is the best conduit for the will of the people. Though a debate rages
on what constitutes instrumental goals, our terminal goals of "life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness" are never questioned. A pluralistic democracy
puts meaning in those words.
One of the most promising efforts at an operational definition of United
States national interests was made by Donald Nuechterlein. I will use his
framework to examine United States national interests in the Republic of
Korea. Nuechterlein states the national interest is the "perceived needs and
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desires of one soverign state in relation to the sovereign states comprising
the external enviornment.7 He breaks the national interest into four
categories:8
(1) defense interests: the protection of a nation-state and its citizens
against the threat of physical violence.
(2) economic interests:the enhancement of the nation-state's
economic well-being.
(3) world-order interests: the maintenance of an international
political and economic system in which the nation-state can feel
secure and in which its citizens and commerce may operate
peacefully outside its borders.
(4) ideological interests, the protection and furtherance of a set of
values that the citizens of a nation-state share and believe to be
universally good.
Nuechterlein further explains the different intensities of these interests
which determine the action a nation-state is willing to take to defend and
protect these interests.9 When the very existence of a nation-state is in
jeopardy, then these interests are considered survival issues. Any degree
of a nation-states's national power can be utilized to defend survival
interests. When a interest is not as citical, but serious harm will likely
result to the nation-state unless action is taken, these interests are
considered vital. Conventional military action is often the result of
protecting vital interests. Major interests are those interests than may
adversely affect the political, economic, or ideological well-being of the
nation-state and requires corrective actions. Interests are said to be
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peripheral when the nation-states's well-being in not adversely affected
but individual Interests within that nation-state might be endangered.
Survival Interests are easily distinguished but defining what
constitutes a vital, major, or peripheral interest is not so easy.
Nuechterlein lists a number of factors that play a role in our estimation of
the threat. Proximity is of major importance. The closer the threat is to
our borders, the higher the degree of interest. Activities in Cuba seem to be
a more serious threat that the same action in East Germany. The economic
stake we have in an issue is a factor. A threat to trade with the Republic of
Korea may be seen as major whereas a threat to trade with Libya may be
only of peripheral interest. The type of government surrounding the issue
is important. If the threat is from a Marxist-Leninist regime, it is deemed
more critical that if the threat is from democratic powers. If the strategic
balance of power could be altered over the issue, it becomes vital. The
greater the potential the issue has of affecting world opinion, particularly
that of our allies, the higher its intensity. When determining the intensity
of interests, according to Nuechterlein, we must recognize the costs
involved with protecting those interests. Economic sanctions adversely
affects United States business interests. Military invention could result in
casaulties and a protraction or escalation of the conflict. Even if we feel
military intervention is warranted, confidence that such an intervention will
bring about the desired result, affects the value we place on the interest.
Before declaring a interest vital, and thus a willingness to use military
forces to protect that interest, we should consider whether our allies are
behind us or even more important, the U.S. Congress and the American people.
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II. EARLY AMERICAN INTERESTS AND POLICIES IN KOREA
In 1845, a resolution was introduced in Congress by Zadoc Pratt of New
York to extend American commerce by sending a mission to Japan and Korea.
War with Mexico seemingly apparent, however, the resolution failed.
After the opening of Japan in 1854, commerce between Chinese and Japanese
ports made the navigation of Korean waters a necessity. On
24 June 1866, Captain McCaslin and surviving shipmates aboard the
shipwrecked Surprise, who had been treated well by the Koreans, were
delivered to the U.S. consul in Newchwang, China. In July 1866, the General
Sherman sailed from Chefoo, China to Korea on a supposed trading mission.
But its excess of armament supports a claim that the crew intended to rifle
the tombs of Korean kings at Pyongyang in search for gold. After two days of
sailing up the Ta Tong River, the General Sherman was never heard from
again. In January 1867, Captain Shufeldt was sent from the Asiatic
squadron upon the U.S.S. Wachusetts to inquire about the General
Sherman. He was told that the crew of the General Sherman was
mistaken for pirates and killed. Commander Febiger on the U.S.S.
Shenandoah went to Korea in May 1867 to make further inquiries but
learned nothing more than Shufeldt. That same month, two ships which had
on board a German-American named Ernst J. Oppert and F.B. Jenkins, a former
American interpreter at the U.S. Consulate in Shanghai, went to Korea to steal
the bones of a ex-king and hold them for ransom . They failed. In the
summer of 1868, the Secretary of State William H. Seward approached the
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French, who were also having problems in Korea with the persecution of
their Catholics, for a joint punitive mission. France refused. In May 1871,
the Minister to China, Frederick F. Low and the Commander-in-Chief of the
Asiatic Squadron, Admiral John Rogers, sailed to Korea under the orders of
Secretary of State Hamilton Fish to open Korea for trade and secure a treaty
for protection of shipwrecked sailors. The Low-Rodgers expedition of six
ships, carrying eighty-five guns and 1230 men, met fierce Korean resistance
on the island of Kanghwa, near the mouth of the Han river. Their only result
was the destruction of five Korean forts and 350 Korean soldiers killed. 10
After Japan negotiated the Treaty of Kangwa with Korea in 1876,
America became that much more anxious to establish trade relations with the
peninsula. In 1878, the Secretary of State, then William Evarts, ordered
Shufeldt, Commodore and commander of the U.S. 5. Ticonderoga, back to
Korea. Shufeldt, motivated at least in part by his desire for personal fame
and glory for opening Korea, sought in 1880, the good offices of the
Japanese to help. This effort failed. Instead Shufeldt negotiated a treaty
with Korea through the Chinese viceroy, Li Hung-chang, which was acceptable
to all parties. The motives of Li Hung-Chang were two-fold. First, he wanted
to enlist American assistance in checking the Japanese and Russian influence
on the peninsula.. Second, Li wanted to make clear the control China had over
the Korean kingdom. 1 ' The Treaty of Amity and Commerce, signed by King
Kojong on May 22, 1882, provided for the exchange of diplomats, protection
of shipwrecked sailors and U.S. citizens, extraterritoriality, and a most-
favored nation clause for trade. Tyler Dennet claims that the opening of
Korea in 1882 was "by far the most important action undertaken by the United
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States in Asia until the occupation of the Philippines." 12 The 1882 treaty
stated that "if another power deals unjustly or oppressively with either
Government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the
case, to bring an amicable arrangement." 13 This clause was to be a future
bone of contention between the two states when Japan began to "deal
unjustly" with Korea within just few short years.
The early American diplomats, led by the first American minister, Lucius
Foote, kept a good rapport with the Korean court. Dr. Horace Allen served not
only as the Charge d'Affaires and Minister Penipotent iary but also as the
personal physician to the King and Queen. 14 American missionaries, the
first being Horace G. Underwood and Henry G. Appenzeller, arrived in 1885.
They took the evangelical mission very seriously. They pressed for modern
education, medicine, and journalism in Korea. They later led the charge for
the freedom and independence of the Korean people.
American businessmen prospered in Korea with help given by Dr. Allen,
who was not above accepting a bribe for his services. By 1 895, American
businessmen were cutting and exporting timber, developing the railroads and
mines, and selling military hardware to the Korean government. Gold mining
was of particular interest. American business added immensely to the well-
being of the Korean people. Americans constructed the first railway, trolley,
lighting plant, public water supply, telephone, and office building. American
competition with the Japanese was fierce. The Japanese did not always play
fairly. They used their influence in the Korean court to acquire monopolies
and often sold products under fake American trade marks. The average annual
trade between Korea and the United States, for the first thiry years, only
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amounted to just a little over $200,000 which was less than one-hundredth
of one percent of the American total trade. Desiring to remain neutral and
a non-interventionist party in the affairs of Korea, Seceretary of State
Thomas F. Bayard gave the following instructions to Charge d*Affair Foulk in
1885: '5
"Seoul is center of conflicting and almost hostile intrigues involving
the interests of China, Japan, Russian, and England... it is clearly the
interest of the United States to hold aloof from all this and do nothing
nor be drawn into anything which looks like taking sides with any of
the contestants or entering the lists of intrigue for our own benefit."
As war between Japan and China over rights in Korea loomed on the
horizon in 1894, the Department of State warned the American legation in
Korea, 16
"taking any action towards strengthening the authority of the king or
otherwise taking part in matters which do not immediately concern
the interest of the United States, might be open to serious objection
on account of our consistent policy, which we carry out in Asia as well
as Europe and elsewhere, of abstaining from cooperating with other
powers in any intervention of whatever nature."
Despite this warning, Dr. Allen used the American legation to shelter
escapees from the Korean court. He was officially reprimanded with the
reminder that "intervention in the political concerns of Korea is not among
your functions and is forbidden." 17
With the United States feeling that its national interest was more in
line with the appeasement of Japan rather than Korean independence, the
Korean court turned to the Russians for help. King Kojong and the crown
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Prince escaped to the Russian legation on 1 1 February 1 896 where they
stayed for over a year. Russians took the place of Americans advisors in the
government. By 1903, after formally allying themselves with the British to
keep out third parties in the conflict, the Japanese felt strong enough to
challenge the Russians. War began between the two countries on
8 May 1 904 The Japanese were victorious. The Treaty of Portsmouth, ending
the hositilites was mediated by President Theodore Roosevelt.
Continuing to feel Japan was more in our national interest than Korea, the
Taft-Katsura agreement was signed on 29 July 1905. This agreement gave
American recognition of Japan's hegemony over Korea in return for a promise
from Japan not to interfere in the American-held Philippines. On
1 7 November 1 905, Japan made Korea a protectorate. U.S. Secretary of
State, Elihu Root, closed the American Legation in Seoul and began handling
Korean affairs through the legation in Tokyo. Japan tightened the collar
around Korea politically and economically and formally annexed her on
22 August 1910.
Lawrence Battlstini said this of the first three decades of U.S.-Korean
relations, 18
"The United States had no clearly defined policy or program with which
to confront the rivalries of powers in Korea other than the somewhat
nebulous tradition of favoring the development of strong and independent
states everywhere in the Orient."
In short, the United States had a strict policy of neutrality and absolute
non-intervention. It is safe to say that up until the outbreak of hostilities of
the Japanese against the Chinese at the start of the Second World War,
17
matntainance of the Open Door Policy and the protection of American
nationals, mostly missionaries and businessmen, were the only interests of
United States in Korea.
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III. UNITED STATES POLITICAL INTERESTS
A. HISTORICAL LOOK AT KOREAN POLITICS
At the Cairo Conference In November 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill, and
Chiang Kai-shek stated, "Mindful of the enslavement of the Korean people, the
aforementioned Great Powers are determined that Korea shall, in due course,
be free and independent." 19 Soviet leader Josef Stalin concurred at the
Potsdam conference in July 1 945. The Soviets also agreed to enter the war
in the Pacific to defeat the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria at the
request of President Roosevelt in Yalta in February 1945. However, they did
not declare war on Japan until 8 August. Furthermore, it became obvious that
Manchuria was not their only objective. Taking advantage of the fact that the
United States army was no nearer than Okinawa, the Soviets marched -into
Korea, on 1 2 August, two days before the Japanese surrender.
Fearful that the Soviets would dominate the entire peninsula, the United
States proposed that the Soviets accept the surrender of the Japanese troops
in Korea north of the 38th parallel. The Soviets agreed and General Order No.
1, effecting the partition, was issued to MacArthur on 13 August 1945. This
action set the stage for one of the largest military build-ups and most
hostile environments on the globe.
Americans troops did not arrive on the peninsula until 8 September 1945.
Two days earlier, the Koreans had proclaimed the "Korean People's Republic"
headed by Yo Un-hyong. However, the U.S. occupying forces did not recognize
it as a government and forced its dissolution. Initially, the United States had
Japanese officials remain and continue to run the government temporarily,
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but the tremendous uproar from the Korean people this created forced the U.S.
abondon this Idea and Implement a military government under Lieutenant
General John Hodge. In December 1945, the U55R, Great Britain, and the
United States agreed than a provisional government in the form of a
trusteeship would be set up to govern the entire peninsula. This trusteeship,
which was also to include China, infuriated the Koreans who sought to be
"free and independent" as promised and felt that "in due course" had arrived.
The trusteeship a failure, a joint US-USSR commission was set up to
establish an independent government, but the Soviets insisting that
individuals opposing the trusteeship should not be allowed in the political
process, created an impasse. The United States appealed to the United
Nations to resolve the problem. They called for nationwide elections but the
North, under Soviet domination, refused. Instead individual elections took
place. On 1 May 1 948, South Koreans elected a National Assembly which
adopted a constitution and elected Syngman Rhee as President of the Republic
of Korea. On 25 August, the North elected a Supreme People's Council. They
adopted a constitution and proclaimed the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (DPRK) under Kim ll-5ung.
Not content with a divided Korea, the DPRK launched an invasion across
the 38th parallel on 25 June 1950. Kim ll-5ung made two erroneous
assumptions. First, he felt that the populace in the South would rise up and
greet him as a liberator and second, that the U.S. would not come to the
military aid of the South. The latter belief was in part due to recent
speeches, particularly by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, that Korea was
outside the American defense perimeter in Asia that ran from the Aleutians
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through Japan and the Ryukus to the Philipinnes.20 The United States, which
by now had drawn down its armed forces on the peninsula to only a military
advisory group, appealed to the United Nations. On 7 July 1950, a UN Security
Council resolution established a military command composing of armed
forces from sixteen nations under the direction United States. The counter-
attack, by the UN forces under the command of General Douglas MacArthur,
beginning with the Inchon landing on 15 September 1950, was very
successsful, recapturing Seoul on 25 September. UN forces crossed the 38th
parallel on 9 October. However, an event happed on 15 October which changed
the outcome of the war. Chinese regulars crossed the Yalu River and
engaged in combat to assist its North Korean ally. Seoul was again retaken by
the Communists on 4 January 1951. By 15 March, Seoul again under UN
control, a cease-fire was declared and peace negotiations began. An
armistice was signed on 27 July 1953. It established a demilitarized zone
(DMZ) at the 38th parallel and established the Military Armistice
Commission (MAC) to supervise the armistice and settle, through regulations,
any disputes. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) composed
of the nations of Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia was also
established to carry out supervision, observation, and any inspection or
investigation of violations of the armistice.
However, a peace treaty has never been signed and the armistice, which
has never been signed by the Republic ofKorea, has been quite shaky. One ROK
report in 1983 stated that, "Thirty years after signatures were affixed to
the agreement at Panmunjon, the armistice in Korea remains far from secure
and dependable. Though the shooting conflict ceased in a large measure, the
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truce document is virtually in tatters because of frequent violations by
Communist North Korea. Such an unstable state of the Korean armistice
continues to threaten peace and security in this part of the world." It further
reported that North Korea "has committed 76, 274 military provocations in
violation of the armistice agreement over the last 30 years..."21
The political succession In the Republic of Korea has been rather
turbulent. In April 1960, following massive student demonstrations,
President Rhee stepped down in favor of Chang Myun who tried to implement
democratic reforms. However, on 16 May 1961, supported by his wife's
nephew, Lt. Col. Kim Jong Pil, General Park Chung Hee staged a successful
military coup. Park devoted himself to strengthening the military and the
nation's economy. By the late 1960s , military men permeated the National
Assembly, filling one-fifth to one-half of the cabinet posts, and heading
three-quarters of the large, publically financed industrial complexes.22 In
1963, after resigning from the military, Park was elected President.
Heading the Democratic Republican Party (DRP) that he created, Park was
relected in 1967 and again in 1971. His opposition, however, the New
Democratic Party (NDP) managed to win in 1971, one-third of the seats in the
National Assembly.
In 1971, Park declared a state of emergency due to political and social
unrest. Students were rioting on seven campuses in Seoul and one in
Kwangju. On 17 October 1972, he declared martial law at which time Park
dissolved the National Assembly, banned all political activity, closed the
nation's universities for six weeks, and took control of the media. He
instituted the much hated Yushfn Constitution which established the
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National Conference for Unification to elect the President to a six year
rather than the current four year term. In addition, one-third of the National
Assembly was to be named by this National Conference for Unification on
recommendation from the President. This group, the YupongHoe.or
Revitalizing Reforms Political Association, severely limited the power and
credibility of the National Assembly.
Former President Yun Po Sun, opposition leaders Kim Yang Sam and Kim
Dae Jung and twelve others signed the Declaration for the Democratic
Salvation of the Nation which they read in the Myongdong Cathedral on
March 1, 1976. This declaration called for restoration of democracy, a more
active effort for peaceful reunification, and an economic policy that would
make South Korea more independent of foreigners. Supporters of this
declaration were arrested and jailed.
Kim Young Sam became the outspoken leader of the New Democratic Party
(NDP) following President Park's narrow re-election in 1978. On
4 October 1979, the National Assemby voted to expel Kim Young Sam from
the National Assembly. In protest, all the NDP members of the Assembly
resigned. Demonstrations spread through the country.
On 26 October 1979, fearful of a bloody civil war, Kim Jae Kyu, the head
of the KCIA, assassinated President Park. The Prime Minister,
Choi Kyu Hah, assumed the Presidency. Hoping to calm the populace, he
abolished many of the hated emergency decrees and released hundreds of
political prisoners. Censorship was eased. A new constitution was
promised by the end of 1 980 and elections by 1 98 1
.
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In December, General Chun Doo Hwan, the newly appointed commander of
the Defense Security Force began to assert himself. Thirty senior generals,
including General Chung Seung Hwa, the Chief of Staff of the Korean armed
forces, were relieved of command. General Chung was arrested for negligent
duty during the Park assassination.
The spring, however, brought more unrest. Massive demonstrations were
held in Seoul on 15 Nay 1980 which was followed two days later by angry
mobs in Kwangju. After ten days, General Chun Doo Hwan sent troops to
Kwangju who quelled the riots, but not without a bloody confrontation.
Estimates of dead range from 400 to 2000. Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Pil
were jailed. The former was sentenced to death for sedition and the latter
was forced to pay pay back approximately $36 million out of his own pocket
for alleged corruption.
On 31 May -1980, President Choi appointed a Special Committee for
National Security Measures, a junta of twenty-four members, of which
seventeen were military, to take charge of the government. On 16 August,
President Choi resigned. After a brief eleven day stay as President by the
Prime Minister Park Choon Hoon, Chun Doo Hwan who had retired from the
military five days earlier, was elected temporary President by the National
Conference for Unification. Nam Duck Woo was selected as his Prime
Minister. The military-dominated Legislative Council for National Security
was to serve as the legislature and elections for the President and the
National Assembly could be held in 1981. Chun was elected President in
1981. His Democratic Justice Party (DJP), formally the Democratic
Republican Party, encountered little opposition.
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ROK foreign affairs has been almost as turbulent as Its internal politics,
but there have been some positive steps taken it its relations with its
communist nelghors. in early 1971
, President Park announced that he was
prepared to have diplomatic relations with the Soviets and the PRC if they
ceased hostile actitities and recognize the sovereignty of the Republic of
Korea. On 23 June 1 973, Park declared, "the Republic of Korea will open its
door to all nations of the world on the basis of the principle of reprocity and
equality. At the same time, we urge those countries whose ideologies and
social institutions are different from ours to open their doors likewise to
us."23 This 1973 announcement spurned a 5ino-5oviet rivalry to expand their
ROK contacts. These contacts have been primarily In humanitarian, athletic,
scholarly, and economic exchanges.
In 1973, a South Korean team participated In the Universiad games held
in Moscow. Subsequently, many scholars, officials, athletes, and
businessmen have visited the Soviet Union. Seoul received TA5S
representatives in October 1982 to attend the Technical Committee of the
Organization of Asia-Pacific New Agencies, the Director of the Art
Preservation Department of the Soviet Ministry of Culture to attend an
Asian regional conference on art In that same month, and two Soviet
officials in March 1983 to attend a conference on arglculture. The shooting
down of the Korean Airline Flight 007 carrying 269 crew and passengers on 1
September 1983, however, put a screeming halt, at least for a time, on the
Improvment of Soviet-ROK relations.
The Peoples Republic of China seems to be changing their position with a
willingness to engage in contacts with the ROK in various athletic,
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scientific, and economic issues, and an expllct dissociation form the
terrorist acts of North Korea. The Republic of Korea received the Director-
General of the Chinese Civil Aviation Administration and thirty-two other
officials in May 1983 to discuss cooperation in emergency flight situations
following a hijacking that brought a Chinese aircraft to Seoul. Subsequently,
the ROK was allowed to atend a FAO conference and the International
Telecommunications Union conference in Beijing. In March 1985, the Chinese
and South Koreans again engaged in a dialogue. This time it was over an
incident which involved a Chinese torpedo boat which drifted in the Yellow
Sea and was towed to Koreas port of Kunsan. The Chinese entered Korean
territorial waters with one of their warships to reclaim the torpedo boat for
which they subsequently apologized.
Korean politics cannot be wholly understood without a mention about
political parties in the country. President Rhee and President Park both
worked against the Institutionalizing of political parties. They did not allow
any deviation from the accepted line on virtually all important issues.
Therefore, political parties have not been able to create a stable following.
In addition, personal and regional rivalries are deeply edged Into the Korean
political system. Factions, often formed on the basis of provincial origin,
school ties, or a common experience in the past, place individual interests
ahead of that of a group such as a political party. Futhermore, the ruling
regimes have often banned opposition leaders from participation in the
political process which makes Institutionalizing of the political party very
difficult. A good example of this factionalization was seen in the first
National Assembly election since the establishment of the Chun regime. The
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ruling party, the Democratic Justice Party (DJP), received only thlry-slx
percent of the popular vote. Hoever, the remaining votes were spread over
twelve parties. However, in the recent parliamentary election in February
1985, there was an indication that the opposition may be combining forces,
in this election, the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) elected 67 out of the
1 84 elective seats. It also absorbed he Democratic Korea Party (DKP) which
had picked up thiry-five seats making the total of 102 seats out of the 272
seats or 65 percent of the popular vote.
B. CURRENT POLITICAL ISSUES
1. North-South Dialogue
North-South dialogue has been a long and arduous process. Talks for
reunification took place after the Korean War In Geneva, but after failing
miserably, they were canceled In the spring of 1954 Not until 1972,
prompted by the sudden Sino-American rapproachment, did talks, initiated by
Seoul, again take place. These talks had much success. A "hot line" was set
up between the two capitals and the Joint North-South Coordination
Committee was established. In addition, an agenda for Red Cross talks was
also established. This agenda included an ascertainment of the life and
death status of separated families, mutual visits, the resuming of mail
exchange, and reuniting of relatives. However, President Park's domestic
toughnest with the Yushin Constitution forced Kim ll-5ung to get tough as
well and terminate the talks. Kim renewed his demands that the U.S.
withdraw Its troops from the South and the dissolution of the United Nations
Command before talks could be resumed. However, on the bright side, he also
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proposed a reduction of combat troops to 100,000 on eacn side and the
formation of a political consultative conference that would lead to a
confederation of the North and South that would leave both political systems
in place.
in 1973, President Park declared that he would not be opposed to
membership In the United Nations for both the ROK and the DPRK but that he
was opposed to the Idea of a confederation. Pyongyang rejected the offer.
On August 15, 1974, Park made a speech suggesting a mutual
nonaggression pact between the North and the South and the opening of the
countries for cultural exchanges. However, this ceremony ended with an
assassination attempt on President Park which took the life of his wife.
In 1975, Kim I1-5ung rejected U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's
proposal for "cross-recognition" of the two Koreas by the four major powers
In the region. China and the Soviet Union would recognize South Korea and the
United States and Japan would recognize North Korea, paving the way for
entry of both countries into the United Nations.
In January 1979, President Park announced that he would hold talks with
Kim I1-Sung "anywhere, anytime, at any level, to achieve unification and
pursue prosperity". In July of 1979, Kim rejected as well a proposal by the
U.S. and the ROK for a tripartite conference between the U.S. and the two
Koreas despite a nod from Beijing. Kim ll-5ung felt that South Korea, not a
party to the armistice, should not be included in the talks concerning
armistice or a permanent peace treaty. The United States, however, has
refused to talk with North Korea unless South Korea can fully participate.
Nevertheless, the two countries did hold some minor talks for two months in
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1979. The climate of the talks deteriorated, however, when a new military
assessment of the North was made public showing massive military build-
ups. Sparked by the assassination of President Park, Pyongyang invited the
South Korean Prime Minister to the North for continued dialogue but the talks
were unilaterally suspended by Pyongyang when the domestic political
situation in the South turned stable.
In October 1980, Kim ll-5ung proposed at the Sixth Workers Party
Congress the formation of the "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo".
However, he demanded the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the South and a
"democratic" change in the South Korean government before talks of
unification could begin.
ROK President Chun Doo Huan proposed an exchange of visits between
himself and Kim immediately after he was inaugurated in March 1 98 1 . In
January 1982, he called for a constitution under which the two Koreas would
be reunited, and proposed that a Council for Unification be established to
handle the matter. Kim rejected these proposals and the proposal of
exchanging information on separated families through the Red Cross until the
U.S. withdrew it troops and there was a change of the present government in
Seoul.
In June of 1983, Pyongyang did allow 9000 separated families a reunion
with thier families after 33 years. But this turned out to be the calm before
the storm. On 1 September 1983, when the Soviet Union shot down Korean
Airline, Flight 007, with 269 passengers and crew on board, North Korea
never uttered a word of regret or condolence and supported the Soviet
contention that the airliner was being used in a spy mission. The next month,
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North Korea sponored an event that came very close In engulfing the peninsula
In war. This event was the attempted assassination of President Chun in
Rangoon, Burma on 9 October 1983. Seventeen senior officials In the South
Korean government were killed In the bomb explosion. Pyongyang claims that
the Incident was perpetrated by ant 1 -government South Korean dissidents,
but solid evidence points that the act was perpetrated by North Korean
commandos.
In 1984, North Korea stepped up its offers to talk with South Korea. This
may be due in part to the DPRK attempting to erase its image as a terrorist
nation and to develop trade between Itself and capitalist countries. In
January 1984, Pyongyang proposed a tripartite conference through the
Chinese. Washington insisted that a direct dialogue take place between the
North and the South. The North Koreans again demanded a withdrawal of U.S.
forces from the South prior to direct talks with the ROK. In August 1984,
President Chun offered free economic support to the North. This aid was
reciprocated when a series of floods in September 1984 devastated many
areas of South Korea. Pyongyang offered rice, cement, and medicine to the
ravaged areas. On 15 November 1984, an economic meeting was held at
Panmunjom The South was primarily interested in trade while the North was
interested In Joint economic ventures such as fishing or in mineral
exploration. Subsequent economic meetings were held In May and in June
1985.
A Red Cross meeting was scheduled for December 1984 but on
23 November, a Soviet defection at the DMZ ended in a shooting where four
North Korean soldiers were killed. The talks were postponed. The talks were
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rescheduled in January out were again unilaterally postponed Dy the dprk.
The reason was a protest of the R0K-U5 "Team Spirit" exercises where U.S.
and ROK military forces conduct joint maneouvers. In April 1985, the North
proposed talks to discuss a nonaggresslon declaration and a proposal to
demilitarize the Joint Security Area. The South responded affirmatively and
that they wanted to discuss reunification as well. The North agreed. The Red
Cross talks did resume on 28 May 1985 and then again at Panmunjom In July
1985. There were still disagreements on the number of family members that
would visit and which cities that would be allowed to visit but an exchange
of family visits did take place in September of 1985.
On 20 January 1986, Pyongyang unllateraly suspended all parliamentary,
economic and Red Cross talks citing the aggressive 1986 "Team Spirit"
exercises as the reason. In March, Seoul proposed a resumption of the talks
but North Koreas responded that "Seoul"? proposal lacked a sense of reality
and was not worth considering at all at this stage." Nevertheless, President
Chun has expressed hope for a summit meeting with Kim ll-5ung before the
end of 1986 to solve "urgent Issues inherent In a divided country and to
prevent miscalculations and misjudgements that could lead to war." ^
1. Constitutional Amendment
During the 38-year history of the Republic of Korea, Its constitution
has experienced seven major revisions. With the exception of the 1960 and
1980 revision , they were all to give the incumbent president more power and
longer tenure. The 1 980 constitution has the following major provisions:24
1. The President Is to be elected for only one 7-year term.
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2. The President is to be elected by an electoral college of 5,000
delegates who may let their preferences be known to the voters
prior to the election.
3. The National Assembly may call for the resignation of all the
cabinet members and Prime Minister.
4 The National Assembly is elected to a 4-year term by popular
election based on proportional representation.
5. The President may not dissolve the parliament within one year
of its formation and cannot disband the National Assembly more
than twice for the same reason.
6. Presidential emergency measures can only to taken when the nation
is in a state of war or an extraordinary situations similar to it exists.
The National Assembly must approve all emergency measures.
In 1986, the impetus for constitutional reform is coming from the
people. A major constitutional revision is currently being advocated to have
the election of the President by popular vote. There is significant popular
belief that the election process is flawed and that the incumbent can control
the electoral college and have elected the candidate of his choice. To promote
their cause, the NKDP has proceeded with a signature campaign on petitions
demanding the constitutional amendment through local chapter rallies and
house visitations. Since March 1986, five major rallies in Seoul, Pusan,
Kwangju, Taegu, and Taejon, have been held to celebrate openings of
provincial headquarters for constitutional rewriting.
President Chun has declared the signature campaign illegal as a threat to
the politcal stability. Initially the government tried to prevent the campaign
by police cordons around the NKDP offices and intermittent house arrests of
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students demonstrating In favor of the revision, (lore recently, however, the
government has backed off and shown more tolerance for the campaign.
The ruling party is opposed to this revision ai least until there has oeen a
transference of power under the 1 980 constitution in 1 988. The Prime
Minister of South Korea, Lho Shln-yong, claiming that the 1980 Constitution
was adopted with absolute support of the people, sums up the DJP view this
way,25
"If we split public opinion and waste valuable national energy by
haggling over the issue of changing the Constitution at this crucial
moment, it will not only make it difficult to carry out our national
tasks [1988 Olympic games and transference of power] but also
incur a crisis."
The DJP has given some indication of compromise. Lee Sang-il, chairman of
the DJP's Central Committee and Ron Tae-Woo, the DJP chairman, have both
stated that the ruling party was ready to negotiate with the opposition on
amending the Presidential Election Law. One possible amendment, they
suggest, could stipulate that members of the electoral college must vote for
candidates put up by their own party. The DJP insists however, that revision
of the constitution for direct election of the President would not be
considered until 1989. The opposition has rejected the proposal for
rewriting of the election law.26 The DJP has also promised their candidate
for the 1988 election will pledge support of a constitutional revision.
Furthermore, a 20-day Special National Assembly session was opened on 21
March 1986 to discuss this issue.
Where does the United States stand on constitutional reform? This is best
explained by Congressman Stephen Solarz who recently declared,27
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"For American Interest to be served and for political disaster in Korea
to be avoided, there should be a compromise in which both the Korean
government and the opposition give up some of what they seek for the
sake of progress and stability."
3. Human Rights
The Republic of Korea has had a long history of repressive regimes
where human rights violations have taken place under the auspices of
national security necessities. However, from the outset, the United States
has sought to develop a working democratic system in the ROK and remains
committed to the support of human rights. This support may be best
explained by Edward Olsen who says that many Americans feel it " is the
right of the United States to ask that allies who are being protected so they
can be free and democratic should, in fact, try to be precisely that..."29
The United States was extremely upset when Korean armed forces,
operationally under the UN Command, supported the coup d'etat of
General Park Chung Hee in May 1961. Again using military and economic aid
as a political weapon, the United States threatened a termination of this aid
if General Park did not hold elections to restore a civilian government.
General Park acquiesced. In 1963, he promulgated a new Constitution and held
elections which he won regardless.
The high point of U.S. political intervention was in the early years of the
Park government when the US threatened to withdraw economic and military
assistance if Park did not soften his excesses. However, when the ROK sent
a division of combat troops to Vietnam in 1965, the Johnson administration
lost all reservations about the legitimacy of the Park government.
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Furthermore he praised Park lavishly for his achievements and governing
ability. However, In the mld-1970's, with a deterioration In democracy In the
government under the Yushin Constitution, the U.S. again became interested
in human rights violations in the ROK. This was especially true In 1975,
when one of one of the harshest decrees, Emergency Measure Number 9, was
declared. This decree forbade criticism of the government and ordered prison
terms of at least one year for any engaged in any activity seen as dangerous
to the government. The decree censored newspaper editors and publishers and
outlawed student riots. Ant 1-government student leaders were jailed or
expelled. Independent campus organizations were forbidden. All students
were forced to join the paramilitary National Student Defense Corps.
Activists were jailed, placed under house arrest, and frightened into silence.
It also permitted arrest, detention, search, and seizure without a warrant.
The U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, demonstating a concern of
human rights violations, directed the President to "reduce or terminate
military or economic assistance to any government which engaged In a
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights. The act allowed a waiver to this aid provided Congress Is advised of
extraordinary drcustances. The 1975 Military Assistance Authorization Bill
required the State Department to provide reports to Congress on the status of
human rights in various countries and all lowed Congress to terminate
assistance based on these reports.
Congressional dlsgruntlement toward the Republic of Korea was
exacerbated with the Tongsun Park Affair. From 1976-78, South Korea put
forth an effort to Influence decion making and public oplnon In the United
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States. The Tongsun Park Affair, also called "Koreagate", was an attempt
headed by Korean businessman, Tongsun Park, to gain United States support of
the Korean government and mitigate the interest of Congressmen on human
rights abuses In their country. This attempt Included a distribution of
approxmatety $750,000 in political payments to Congressional campaign
funds and parties for Congressmen which Included "extra" favors from
female hostesses. The Koreans also tried to distort Voice of America
broadcasts, exert pressure on Korean- lanuage newspapers and broadcasts in
the United States and Intimidate publishers, editors, and reporters to kill
stories critical of the ROK. Research Institutes and Individual scholars were
approached with offers to underwrite studies that promoted South Korea In a
good light. When the United States Congress demanded that the Korean
Ambassador Kim Tong-Jo return to the United States and testify, the Koreans
were outraged. A diplomatic disaster was averted however, when
Ambassador Kim agreed to respond to questions in writing.
.
President Chun"s loosening of press censorship, his acceptance of the
opposition gaining a large share of the seats in the National Assemby in the
1985 election indicate his recognition that some easing of authoritarian
control is necessary. There Is a fear however, that as the opposition gains
strength and becomes more outspoken in its criticism, the government may
become more repressive.
Nevertheless, the reports of human rights violations continue. Two of
the most recent reports include the beating death of a civilian in the military
reserve for supporting the petition drive for constitutional reform and the
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electrical shock and water torture of fourteen workers from two publishing
houses for printing ant 1-government remarks.30
The United States* interest In human rights violations of the South
Korean government Is based on several things. First, there Is a genuine
concern for ethical and humanitarian behavior of governments, especially
governments that are receiving security support as well as economic
cooperation from the United States. Second, there Is a concern for political
stability In the ROK. The United States fears than repression and
authoritarianism may lead to serious political disruptions that could
jeopardize the security interest of the United States in the region. Third, the
U.S. fears a rising anti-American sentiment in the South Korean people if they
feel that the United States Is doing nothing to instill freedom and democracy
In their country. Our Interest in this area Is best summed up by John Glenn
and Hubert Humphrey when they declared, "American people have a
humanltrarlan interest in encouraging freedom for all men; and the United
States has a national Interest In preventing political oppression in South
Korea from causing a major domestic confrontation."31
Nevertheless, the United States has to face the political and security
realities In the ROK and not jeopardize its objective of promoting a stable
and effective government. Stability is the vital interest. If that stability
is best achieved by promoting democratic reform and supporting the cause of
human rights, which It Is, then our actions In this area Is warranted.
However, the best means to achieve this are for the United States to move
behind the scenes to persuade President Chun that long term stability In
South Korea is best effected by the moderation of authoritarian controls.
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Strong arm tactics and overt pressue in this area could result in exactly what
the United States Is tying to combat, Instability In the Chun government
which presents possible security risks. Furthermore, Americans must come
to realize that some authoritarian controls are warranted in South Korea
with the ever lingering threat of an invasion from the North than In this
country. As Claude Buss put it, "the survival and prosperity of the state
takes precedence over the rights and welfare of the Individual"32 A public
opinion poll taken by Seoul National University, Institute of Social Sciences,
conducted In late 1983 found that almost 60 percent of Koreans concurred
with this and held the view that individual rights "can be sacrificed to some
extent for the development of the country."33
We should make every effort to reinforce a democratic behavior in the
South Korean government, but we should not Jepordlze our security interests
In the region by unnecessary Interference in Korean political affairs.
President Reagan was entirely correct when he told the South Korean National
Assembly in 1983, "The surest development of democratic political
institutions is the surest means to build the national consensus that is the
foundation of true security"34 . However, the United States should not use
military assistance as a leverage to deal with the political affairs of South
Korea. American security cooperation should not be based on whether we
agree with their internal politics. We should approach human rights
violations In the manner currently practiced by the Reagan administration,
which Is placing emphasis on quiet diplomacy to effect change. This means,
acclaims the Reagan administration, enabled the opposition leader Kim Dae
Jung to be released from custody in December 1982, has effected the release
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of hundreds or political prisoners, and has allowed student demonstrations to
return to college campuses for the first time since 1972.
Human rights in South Korea is a peripheral interest, not a vital one for
the United States. It only becomes vital when ft affects the political
stability of the country. As Congressman Stephen Solarz recently stated,
"There Is no question we have an Interest in the political stability of South
Korea, since in the event of disorder in the south, Kim ll-Sung might
mlscalulate and launch an attack."35
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IV. UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS
The Pacific Basin has become a vital economic interest to the United
States. In 1984, accounting for about $182 billion or approximately thirty
percent of all U.S. foreign trade in the Pacific Basin surpassed that of U.S.
trade with Western Europe. Many experts claim that by the year 2000,
American trade across the Pacific will be double that across the Atlantic.36
ASEAN, alone could produce a combined GNP of one trillion dollars eary in the
next century. Appendix A gives the breakdown of United States trade in the
Pacific Basin.37 The Pacific Basin provides most of the free world's
resources and production of strategic commodities such as rubber, chromium,
tin, titanium, and platinum. Appendix B gives an indication of the amount and
type of trade that Japan and the newly industrialized countries (NIC's) do
with the United States 38 The unimpeded flow of commerce between Asia and
the the rest of the world is critical for worldwide economic stability and is
thus a vital economic and world-order interest of the United States.
A. HISTORICAL LOOK AT THE KOREAN ECONOMY
"Korea is a very poor nation, and it will take a series of economic
miracles along with good judgement and very hard work to give it
what economists call a viable economy."3^
This statement best typifies the attitude of most economic observers of
Korea even as late as the mid- 1 960's. The separation of North and South
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Korea in 1945 took Its economic toll. The division not only closed potential
markets but even more Important, It cut South Korea off from critical
sources of raw materials. South Korea has only small amounts of anthracite
coal, iron ore, copper, lead, and zinc. Therefore, it has always been heavily
dependent upon outside sources for mineral resources.
The Korean War ( 1 950- 1 953), decimated the country. Fifty percent of the
country's manufacturing, forty percent of the homes, and twenty percent of
the schools had been destroyed. Paddy fields and irrigation ditches laid in
ruin. Over one million lives had been lost. Furthermore, the constant fear
that North Korea would once again make a military advance south of the 38th
parallel, required huge military expenditures. Even today, 35% of the national
budget for South Korea, totaling seven percent of its Gross National Product
(GNP) is allocated for defense.
Syngman Rhee, who was President of the Republic af Korea from August
1948 until July 1960, was too preoccupied with politics to take the proper
concern with the nation's economy. Some factories were started but the
scarcity of essential Inputs and machinery limited their operation. High
Inflation discouraged individuals from putting their money in the bank and
watching their purchasing power erode. Thus, banks couldn't fund business
ventures. The black market economy was much more successful than the
legitimate economy. One-fifth of the working population was unemployed.
The per capita income was $90.00 In 1960. This approximately the per capita
Income of India. The only reason that the economy didn't totally collaspe was
the strong support of South Korea by the United States.
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During the war, the United Nations set up the Civilian Relief Agency to
provide medicine, food, and shelter to the war ravaged South. Following the
Korean conflict, the United States set up the Foreign Operations
Administration which later became the Agency for International Development
(AID). Between 1954 and 1974, U.S. economic aid totaled
$5 billion. The objectives of this aid was to revitalize the economic life of
the nation, assist the ROK in improving resource allocation, developing a
rural economy, accelerating growth and efficiency of domestic and export
industries, and improving the government's organization, administrative
capacities and social policies.40
In July of 1960, Chang Myon was elected Prime Minister on an "Economic
Development First" platform. However, he wasn't given much opportunity to
promote his program. On flay 16, 1961, Major General Park Chung Hee
launched a successful military coup to take control of the government. Park,
however, also made the Korean economy his first priority and he went to
work developing one of the fastest growing economies in the world.
An examination of some of President Park's strategies that spurned the
tremendous growth In the South Korean economy, Is In order. One of Park's
first acts was to set up the Economic Planning Board (EPB). This organization
was set in 1961 to examine the economy, determine suitable ways of
improving it, and draw up appropriate plans. The EPB was also placed in
charge of approving joint ventures and technology licenses. The importance
of this board was demonstrated in 1963 when the EPB Minister was given the
title of Deputy Prime Minister.41 Parked also tasked the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry with approving the establishment of individual
42
companies and monitoring their operations. The Ministry of Finance was
charged with regulating the banks and keeping tabs on the credit flow.
In 1965, Seoul "normalized" relations with Tokyo which paved the path of
massive Japanese investment capital. In 1966, the Foreign Capital
Inducement Law was enacted which featured provisions which accorded
foreign Investors special tax credits and guarantees of repayments.
Park pressed for an "export-propelled" economy. Most of the government
sponsored incentives were given to export companies. These incentives
included reductions of corporate and private Income taxes, tariff exemptions
for raw materials Imported for export production, financing of imports
needed for producing exports, business tax ememptlons, accellerated
depreciation allowances, and tax exemptions on capital equipment. Monthly
export promotion meetings were held. It was considered patriotic to export.
The 30th of November was declared "Export Day". Annual ceremonies have
been held to remind the public of the crucial role exports play in the nation's
economy, and to present awards to people who have contributed most to the
cause.42 It was felt that the maintainance of international competitiveness
in exports would force South Korean factories to produce more efficiently.
Initially an import-substitution policy was used to protect "Infant
Industries", but never to a large extent. As soon as these import-substitution
factories covered domestic needs, they were encouraged to export. Between
1968 and 1973, the significant import-substitution industries included those
involved in the manufacturing of synthetic fibers, fertilizers, iron, steel,
finished metal products such as automobiles, transport equipment, non-
electrical machinery, and chemicals. With the exception of the automobile
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and petrochemical industries, this policy proved rather effective.43 Figure
displays the relative importance of the export expansion and import
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In March 1971 , the Korea Development Institute (KDI) was set up with
the responsibility of forseeing problems and issues that the Korean economy
was likely to face and present suggestions for policy. It still conducts
seminars with government officials, industry representatives, and college
professors in order to bridge the gap between the government and the
academic and business coomunities. The KDI currently has thirty-seven
senior and 1 00 junior researchers on its staff.45
In 1973, South Korea announced a policy that began a whole new phase of
industrialization which focused in the area of heavy and chemical industries.
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New shipyards, Iron and steel plants, and automobile manufacturing plants
sprang up. Growth rates soared. This made foreign loans easily attainable.
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By the late seventies, dissent against the government became prevalent.
Though Park had done immeasurable good for the Korean economy, his "iron
glove" rule disquieted many people. This dissent plateaued with Park's
assassination in October, 1979. His assassination brought chaos to the
economy. Strikes were commonplace. The company increased wages to
appease the strikers but this fueled a spiral ing Inflation. Exporters took the
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brunt of this. Their export businesses began drying up due to the high price of
Korean goods. Investment capital, both foreign and domestic, was cut off as
people were not willing to gamble on factory production with the disorder
and unrest In 1 980, South Korea suffered a 6.2% negative growth rate.47
It Is unfair, though, to blame political Instability on all of South Korea's
woes. The ROK had become overamblttous in Its development. Too many
shipyards and assembly plants were built and the excess capacity could not
be used. The oil crisis in 1979 also played a major role In the economic
woes. Many factories were built on the assumption there would continue to
be a flow of cheap oil Into the county. In addition, many of the industries
were developed on the assumption that there would be a steady growth in the
world economy and international trade. Neither of these assumptions were to
become true.
• Nevertheless, tremendous successes were made In the Republic of Korea.
Let's examine some of them. In 1961, there were only two small plants
producing cement Then the government started building bridges, dams, and
highways. Factories started springing up at a tremendous rate and the
construction of thousands of homes were required. This created an
unprecedented demand for cement. Production Increased from one million
tons of cement in 1961 to twenty-four million tons in 1984 The Ssangyong
Cement Industrial Company currently produces nearly one-half of South
Korea's cement. It Is the world's largest cement producer, making 1 1.5
million tons annually. South Korea became the twelve largest producer of
cement in the world in 1982 and hopes to be ranked sixth in the world by
1986.48
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Electronics was regarded as a "strategic export industry" beginning in
1969 with the Electronic Industry Promotion Law. Thus, it acquired many
government incentives. The Korea Institute of Electronics Technology, the
Korea Electro-technolgy and Telecommunications Research Institute, and the
Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology were established to
promote advances In the field. From 1971 to 1981, sales of electronic
equipment increased from $88 million dollars annually to $2.2 billion. The
number of jobs in the industry increased ten-fold in the first seven years of
that time period, though It declined slightly afterwards. In the 1970"s annual
production in electronics increased an average of 44% and the export of these
goods showed a 43% increase. Sixty percent of all the electronics produced
In South Korea is exported, accounting for 1 1% of their total exports in 1981.
Initially, South Korea only produced parts and components, but as of 1981,
only 49% of their production was for parts and components. Forty-two
percent of their production was in consumer products and 9% in industrial
equipment.49
Textiles have been South Korea's most important export commodity. At
their peak in the mid-1970's textiles accounted for 40% of South Korea's
export earnings. In 1 981 , this figure had declined to 30%. The ROK exported
$6 billion worth of textiles in 1983 and $7 billion worth In 1985, yet the
textile percentage of export earnings fail to 25% and 23. 1% respectively.50
Construction work in Korea took off with the building of the Seoul
subway, the Kimpo International Airport, and the Seoul-Pusan highway. For
over two decades, construction increased an average of 1 5% a year. Overseas
contracts have been particularly lucrative. By 1982, there were sixty
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contraction firms doing projects in the Middle East alone. These firms
accounted for $13.6 billion in Income in 1982. There were $6.5 billion worth
of new contracts with Iraq, Libya, and Saudi Arabia alone, in 1984. Hyundai
Engineering and Construction won a $730 million contract to build a power
plant south of Baghdad, Iraq which was a portion of the $1.62 billion of new
overseas contracts for Hyundai in the first six months of 198451
Korea's annual steel production reached 14 million tons In 1983. Pohang
Iron and Steel which began producing in 1973, became the twelfth largest
steel producer In the world in 1983 producing 8.5 million tons of steel a year
with sales of $2.4 billlon.52
Hyundai opened the largest shipyard in the world in 1974 at Ulsan. By
1983, South Korea became the second largest shipbuilder in the world behind
Japan. In 1972, it had 141 shipyards producing 190,000 gross tonnage which
was only .2% of thw world market, la 1982, it had 160 shipyards producing
4,000,000 gross tons, or 5.8% of the world market. In 1983, the ROK exported
$3.7 billion worth of shipbuilding business. This Included repairs and
conversions as well as new ships.53
Agriculture also encountered success. South Korea Is mountainous and
covered with forests, allowing only two million hectares or approximately
20% of the total land area to be cultivated. However, many projects were
undertaken to increase the productivity of the land. The number of power
tillers, tractors, and threshers increased twenty-fold with one decade.
Chemical fertilizers were purchased, much of which was with American aid.
New varieties and strains of crops were developed. In July of 1 961 , Park
established the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation to give loans,
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mostly government loans, to farmers. It also counseled farmers on the use of
fertilizers, machinery, and special varieties of crops. The Office of Rural
Development was established to centralize agrlcultrual research and
development. Government price supports to farmers were implemented, in
1971, President Park initiated the Saemaul Undong or New Community
Movement in which the government provided funds to farmers for small
bridges, Irrigation projects, or home improvements. The government supplies
the money or the materials and the farmers provide the labor.
South Korea attained, at one point, a rice yield" of 5,000 kilograms per
hectare, which was the highest yield of rice per hectare In the world. This
allowed South Korea to be self-sufficient in rice for awhile, but soon
population growth required them to continue importing rice.54 Other
agricultural successes were made in wheat, barley, fruits and vegetables, and
tobacco. Net sales in agriculture approached $4 billion in 198455
* There have been numerous other successes. In maritime shipping, South
Korea's 1980 level of 82 million tons was nine times their 1962 level. Since
1962, Korea Air Lines increased the number of its jets from thirteen to
forty-two, making it the biggest airline in the Orient. It now flys to twenty-
seven major cities in eighteen countries. In 1982, Korea ranked fifth in
plywood constuction with a capacity of 7.5 million square feet, accounting
for three percent of their total exports. In 1982, South Korea ranked as the
fourth largest exporter of footwear with sales of $ 1 billion a year. Footwear
accounted for five percent of the total exports and ranked as the fifth best
export earner for Korea behind textiles, electronics, steel, and ships. Korea
ranked sixth in the world in toy production.56
49
How do all these successes add up In terms of overall growth? From
1962-1982, the Gross National Product (6NP) of South Korea increased an
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The GNP for 1980 and 1984 were 60.3 billion and 82.9 billion respectively.
This brought the per capital GNP from $90.00 in 1960 to $2,041 in 198458
What role did manufacturing play in this growth? In the early 1960's
manufacturing accounted for 14% of South Korea's GNP. This increased to
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FIGURE 4
Investments accounted for 13% of the 6NP In 1962. This Increased to 22% In
1972 and 27% In 1982. Domestic savings increased from 3% to 16% to 22% of
the 6NP over the same time period.60 However, much Investment capital was
still required. In 1972, South Korea had borrowed $4 billion. This had risen
to $43 billion in 1985. Inflation has been kept under control. After a high of
30% in 1980, inflation was arrested at 3.8% in 1984 and 3.6% in 1985.
Exports have been critical to the South Korean economy. This importance
of exports in the Korean economy is illustrated in Table 1 61 Table 2 lists
their top exports for 1 985 62
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Textiles and garments 6976 (23.1%)
Ships and vessels 5,013 (16.6%)
Electronics 4,228 (14.0%)
Steel products 2,567 (8.5%)
(in $ millions and percentage of total exports)
SOURCE: Korea Herald, 1 1 March 1986
TOP EXPORT ITEMS
TABLE 2
In the 1960's manufactured goods accounted for 20% of the ROK's
exports. By 1962, they accounted for 80%-90% of the exports. Total exports,
themselves, grew from $55 million to $2.2 billion in that same time period.
Exports accounted for only 1% of the GNP in the 1950's. This percentage
grows to 30% by the late 1 970's. South Korea's trade partners had also
changed considerably as Table 3 displays.63
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PERCENTAGE OF EXPORTS PERCENTAGE OF IMPORTS
1970, 1990 1970. 1980.
us 47 26 30 22
Japan 28 17 41 26
Asia 10 15 16 11
Europe 9 18 11 9
Middle East 1 15 7 23*
^Reflects the impact of oil price hikes
TABLE 3
B. FUTURE PROSPECTS
Estimates of the economic future of South Korea is mixed. The President
of Ssangyong Cement Industrial Company feels that the prospects for future
sales are "cloudy" as the market is expected to grow slowly and the growing
competition from Japan, Taiwan, and Indonesia. Cement plants operated at
only 74% capacity in 1985. The first quarter of 1986 showed a 21.9% drop in
cement production over the same period in 1985 with plants operating at only
55% capacity.64
The future of the construction industry in South Korea is very
questionable as stagnant oil revenues, local competition, and completion of
long term projects in the Middle east have led to a decline in South Korean
construction orders. There was only $700 million in new orders from the
Middle East in 1985. In addition, unpaid bills from the Middle East total $2.29
billion. Continuing drops in the price of oil will only make their situation
worse. These losses have been offset somewhat with projected pickups in
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domestic construction with large public facilities and infastructure
expansion. The Economic Planning Board and Koreas's Ministry of Construction
project numerous large scale projects such as the expansion and development
of highways, ports, airports, dams, urban renewal and industrial water
system projects, and increases in private and public housing.
There are some bright spots. Sun Suk Tae, the executive director of
Daewoo textiles division predicts that textile exports should grow 15-25%
annually and reach $20 billion in five years. Others believe that the recent
boom in textiles is short-lived and that automation and mechanization In
developing countries will limit the scope of the Korean textile boom. What
all do agree on , though, is that Korean producers must make a transition from
low quality fabrics and garments to higher value-added fashion garments
which require emphasis on design, quality control, and rapid respons to
market preferences.
The Korean government has targeted electronics production as a major
growth sector throughout the 1980's and Is supporting investment research
and development In telecommunications and computers, semi-conductors, and
Integrated circuits. Government investment in semiconductor research alone
will total $2 billion by the end of 1986. It is projected that electronics
exports will grow at a rate of 17% annually up to 1989 and emerge as South
Korea's largest export item, taking over that position from textiles. Exports
of electronics In 1989 are projected to be $10.1 billion.65 Sales will mostly
be in these major export items: color and black and white television sets,
automatic data processing machines, telephone, semiconductors, video tapes,
cathode ray tubes (CRTs), and microwave ovens.
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What are some of the problems of the South Korean economy? Many
economists believe that Korea Is rapidly running out of untapped
opportunities and there simply aren't as many new articles to sell and
certainly fewer new markets.
What problems lie ahead for the ROK? According to many Koreans, the
biggest problem they face is their foreign debt. Foreigt debt leaves a bad
taste in the mouth of Koreans, as the Japanese used unpaid debts as an excuse
to annex Korea in 1910. The government of Korea has a total debt of $43
billion dollars, or 54% of itsGNP. This is up from $40.1 billion a year earlier.
South Korea is Asia's largest borrower and the fourth- largest in the world. It
spends over 16% of its foreign exchange earnings to service this debt. Tight
monetary controls were enacted in July 1984. The EPB made a policy that the
annual growth rate of the money supply (M2 ) would be held at 10% of import
growth in order to reduce the current account balance.66
The Finance Ministry feels that if labor relations are not Improved, labor
unrest could become the country's biggest problem. It feels that Korean
companies need labor peace and low wage increase to compete with countries
such as Japan and China.. In the first six months of 1985, the Labor Ministry
counted 146 labor disputes, twice the number in 1984. Many strikes were led
by university graduates who have taken jobs in factories to organize
workers.69
Hong Wontack feels that the greatest danger to South Korea is its lack of
natural resources. Recognizing that a country must secure a dependable
supply of resources with reasonably stable prices, he comments, "the major
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question is whether a resource-poor country like Korea can survive the
seemingly aggravating tyranny of resource-rich wealthy countries."70
Another problem the ROKwill have to deal with, according to sociologists,
is a serious income disparity between white-collar professionals and wage
workers, between city and farm workers, and between skilled and unskilled
laborers. The EPB has shown that in 1984, the top 20% of the population
claimed 45.6% of the nation's wealth with the bottom 40% taking 16.1
percent 71
To combat these problems, the ROK has made has been to deemphasize the
ability to export and reward more for developing new products, improving
quality, and selling goods under their own brand names.72 The KDI is very
optimistic. Exports are projected to rise by 15.4% and imports by 1 2%
through 1986 assuming crude oil prices increase no more than 2-3%.
Projected debt by 1 986 has dropped from $64.5 billion to $47.4 billion. As
shown by figure 5, they predict their GNP will be $93.1 billion in 1986 and
$250 billion by the year 2000. and their per capita GNP to rise to $2,226 in
1986 to $5,000 in the year 2000. Figure 5 displays these predictions.73
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C. CURRENT ECONOMIC I55UE5
1. Energy
In 1979, 80 percent of East Asia's energy was Imported with 100
percent of their petroleum Imported; 90 percent of the petroleum came from
the Middle East. A loss of that oil would be debilitating to Korea and Japan
and could possibly lead to economic and political chaos and make that region
susceptible to communist aggression. Most of the oil produced by the Middle
East passes through the Indian Ocean sea lanes in reaching European and Asian
consumers. The United States has a short-term w'te/world-order interest
and a long-term vital survival interest in keeping those sea lanes open. A
move toward less dependency on this Arab oil, by our Asian allies, is in our
national interest. Therefore, we should encourage and assist a move in that
direction. South Korea is making an attempt. In its current Five Year Social
and Economic Development Plan (1982-86), Korea plans to reduce its
dependence on petroleum from 58 percent in 1981 to 46 percent by 1986.
2. Trade and Business Ventures
United States trade relations with the Republic of Korea currently
constitutes a major U.S. interest and if trade continues to grow at the
present rate, that Interest may well increase and become vitafzs happened
with Japan. Korea currently ranks seventh among U.S. trading partners with
trade totally $17.2 billion in 1985. Korean Imports from the United States,
totaling $6.5 billion in 1985, made South Korea the United States' eighth
largest export market worldwide. These imports were mostly technical,
capital-intensive goods such as computers, airplanes, machinery, engines,
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power generators, and agricultural products such as rich, wheat, corn, and
cotton. It Is the fourth largest purchaser of U.S. agricultural products. The
United States, accounting for 34% of Korea's exports, imports Korean
textiles, clothing, footwear, TV sets, consumer electronic goods, and steel
products. Appendix C sums up the amount of trade that the U.S. has
historically maintained with South Korea.74
There are over 125 American businesses In Korea. The maintenance of
these businesses, while not vital to American national interests, are vital
to the Korean economy. U.S. businesses have invested over $471 million in
1 72 projects In South Korea by the end of 1 983. This accounts for 27.6% of
all foreign investment in the ROK. Furthermore, U.S. businesses and banks
have lent about $6 billion to Korean businesses and the Korean government.
These investments have strengthened the Korean economy and thus has
contributed to the security of the country. As President Park stated, "$ 1
billion of investment is as important as one division of troops".
3. Protectionism
The Republic of Korea, being export oriented, Is very suseptlble to
other countries' protectionist measures. Early In the economic relationship
between the two countries, the United States granted ready access to its
market at concessional terms to the ROK. The American private sector led
the way in granting loans to South Korea. Though Japan led In technology
transfer to South Korea, the United States was the primary supplier of
licensing and technical cousultancy. More Importntly, it provided an
indispensible shield of military security which allowed South Korea to focus
59
on the building of its commercial industries. However, in the early seventies,
President Richard Nixon moved to offset the negative impact of massive
imports into the United States. He challenged the International Money Fund
(IMF) and General Agreements on Trade and Tariffs (6ATT) policies by adding
a 10% surcharge on American imports. Furthermore, the worst recession in
American history since the Great Depression hit the United States in the late
seventies. This sparked an even stronger environment favoring
protectionist measures in the United States. This mood has recently been
intensified by the United States moving from being a net creditor nation to a
net debtor nation last year. This protectionist environment is best
exemplified by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 with its emphasis on
reciprocity in trade. It states that if a foreign trade partner fails to open its
markets, the the U.S. government can limit market access for that country.
Nam Duck Woo, the chairman of the Korean-U.S. Economic Council says that
forms of protectionism in the United States have reached "epidemic
proportions."67 Former U.S. Ambassador to Korea, Yeutter, recently stated,
"We're closer to a sheer protectionist environment now than at any time since
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930, which worsened the Depression."68 Twenty
of South Korea's trading partners currently use protection measures.
Trade protectionism against South Korea, and for that matter Japan,
Taiwan, Singapore, or other Asian country is not in our national interest.
Economically, protectionism can be proven detrimental to the total well-
being of Americans. Jobs would gained by businesses competing against the
imports but a corresponding number of jobs would be lost by American
importers. Furthermore, prices for consumer goods would be higher for
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Americans. The net affect would be a lower standard of living for Americans
that would more than offset any gain. In addition, protectionist measures
could exacerbate political frictions between the U.S. and its Asian allies; a
political friction that couldn't help but spill-over into security matters. It
is in the American interest to foster a strong and vigorous South Korean
economy.
Asian trade had been used an an escape goat for the unemployment
caused by more deep-seated problems. The heart of the problem of a large
U.S. trade imbalance, is the strong American dollar. The strong dollar, due to
foreign confidence of the United States as a low inflationary, high growth,
nation makes American exports more expensive, thus less competitive. The
strong American dollar Is pricing the American exporter out of business
which adversely affects the job market in the United States. In addition to
the strong dollar, the Asian countries have also upgraded the sophistication
of the products, making them more attractive. They also have improved their
reliability of delivery. Furthermore, American competitiveness Is also
lacking as American industries have been very slow in increasing their
productivity.
Nevertheless, the U.S. Congress Is adament about stemlng the rush
imports Into this country. They recently passed the U.S. Textile and Apparel
Trade Enforcement Act. This act, currenty under veto by President Reagan,
limits the annual increases in imports from major textile exporters to one
percent. The U.S. Congress Is also moving to scap the Generalized System of
Preferences (65P) which have helped Newly Industrialized Countries (NlC's)
such as South Korea, for years. Currently, forty-three percent of South
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Korean export items to the United States fall under some form of import
restlctlon.75 Distressed with this trend, a 30-member trade mission from
the ROK made a visit to the United States in April 1986 to plead their cause.
Liberal markets Is a two-way street, however, and constant pressure
must be applied to the ROK and our other Asian allies to continue their move
toward liberalization of their Imports. The Republic of Korea has made great
strides in this area. South Korea has removed Import licensing rest let ions on
over 300 products. By 1 984, 847% of its imports were free of non-tariff
import barriers. This percentage is to increase to 95% by 1988. In addition,
the tariff rate will be reduced to 16.9% by 1988 from 22.6% In 1983.
Furthermore, there has been a liberalization in the ROK's foreign investment
policy as demonstrated by a revision of their Foreign Capital Inducement Law
effective 1 1 July 1984 Prior to the revision, foreign investments could only
be made in firms that were on a "positive list" and only with government
approval. Currently, investors can invest in any company without government
approval as long as that firm Is not on the government's "negative list". The
list of companies on the "negative list" is rapidly being reduced.
Though It is Impossible to separate entirely our economic from our
strategic interests, the United States should not enter our economic
relationship with the South Koreans blinded by our security interests. As
Edward Olsen states, " bilateral economic frictions must be factored into U.S.
calculations of South Korea's strategic value to the U.S. and what level of
costs Americans should bear on behalf of the R.O.K".76 Nevertheless, these
"bilateral economic frictions" must be based on a real, not a imaginary threat.
Host of the conflicts along the economic lines can be alleviated by a
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realization by the United States that the ROK accounts for only a small
percentage of the U.S. trade deficit and it is being singled out as an "economic
animal" only for political purposes. This is not to say some inequities are not
present in the U.S. trade with Korea which both sides need to resolve.
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V. UNITED STATES STRATEGIC INTERESTS
The Korean peninsula today is, per capita, one of the most militarized
areas of the world. Over 1.2 million regular troops are poised against each
other along a 120 mile stretch of the De-militarized Zone (DMZ) separating
the two countries. This chapter will examine this massive military build-up
and assess what impact the balance of power between the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) has on U.S.
policy in the region. Two particular U.S. policy issues that I will examine are
security assistance to South Korea and the maintenance of U.S. troops on the
peninsula.
U.S. policy decisions about Korea cannot be made in a vacuum, i.e.,
focusing only upon the peninsula. Instead, a regional approach must be taken.
Therefore, I will begin my discussion by looking at the regional balance of
power and the relationship that the major players have with the Republic of
Korea. This section concludes with evidence that despite a rapid military
build-up in the ROK, North Korea still possesses a quantitative lead which
along with its offensive posture still presents a deadly threat to the South.
Therefore, as subsequent discussion delineates, security assistance and a U.S.
troop presence in South Korea are a continued necessity for peace and
stability in Northeast Asia.
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A. REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER
1. Soviet Union
The Soviet Union's actions in recent years in Afghanistan, Poland,
Cambodia, Angola, Nicaragua, and elsewhere are testimony to their dynamism
and expansionist policies. This expansion of Soviet presence and influence in
the world been quite obvious in Asia and the Pacific Basin.
In eary 1979, the Soviets created the Eastern Combined Forces
Command at Khabarovsk to control the three military districts of Zabaykalsk,
Siberia, and the Far Eastern District. This gives the Soviet Asian regions a
degree of operational autonomy that would facilitate Soviet command and
control in the event of a two front war.77
The Soviet Pacific fleet has expanded from a coastal defense force to a
powerful armada threatening the sea lanes with 85 major combatants
including two VT0L/5T0L aircraft carriers, 1 17 submarines (including 31
ballistic missile submarines), 15 cruisers, 18 destroyers, and 60 frigates. In
addition, 40 TU-26 Backfire bombers, specifically designated for a maritime
role, augment the force.78 The Backfire bomber has an unrefueled combat
radius of 3400 miles and its role of interdiction of the sea lines of
communication poses a credible threat to the U.S. Seventh Fleet. The primary
operational mission of the Soviet Pacific Fleet is the security of the Soviet
fleet ballistic missile submarine force based at Petropavlovsk on the
Kamchatka peninsula and to ensure its effective deployment in wartime. A
second major mission of the Soviet Pacific Fleet is the countering of
American ballistic missile firing submarines and carrier groups based in the
Pacific, capable of nuclear strikes on Soviet territory.79
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Over the last ten years, Soviet Far East ground forces have increased
from about 20 to 53 divisions for a total of over 600,000 troops, equipped
with 14,900 tanks and 15,200 artillery pieces, and supported by 1690
tactical aircraft of the Soviet Air Force, Including the recently deployed
MiG31.80
Ten thousand Soviet troops are stationed in Kunashlrl and Etorofu
islands off Hokkaido. They are suported by MlG-23's which have been
recently increased from twenty to forty. In addition, the Soviets have
deployed SSC1 missiles on Etorofu, The SSC1 has a 450 km range and its
conventional warhead can be interchanged with a one klloton nuclear warhead.
Soviet ground forces in the region are planned by Moscow primarily
against the Chinese and would be capable of mounting fast-moving operations
into Xinjiang, and possibly across the Manchurian plain to Beijing, but not
without heavy losses. However, the Soviets must fear a probable nuclear
retaliatory strike against Soviet population centers from the Chinese if such
an attack occurred.
The most ominous symbol of Soviet power in the region is the 134
5S-20 missiles, with a total of 372 warheads, stationed east of the Urals.
Their range in excess of 3,000 miles gives them the capability to threaten
China, Korea, Japan, Guam, the Philippines, and the western portions of the
United States.
Vietnam has given, in return for military and economic assistance,
access to naval and air facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang to project
Soviet power into the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In addition, by obtaining the
rights of overflight and landing in North Korea and the use of North Korean
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ports at Nampo and Najin, the Soviet have also established North Korea as a
staging area for Soviet global military strategy.
The most significant threat to U.S. and allied naval forces in the
Pacific is the large Soviet submarine force. It is likely that in the early
stages of any war significant losses to allied shipping would be inflicted.
However, the U.S. and its allies has a better than even chance of containing
the Soviet Pacific Fleet in northern Pacific waters.
According to Norman D Levin, the regional objectives of the Soviets
Include: 1) countering U.S. air and naval deployments in the Pacific and being
able to interdict the sea and air lines of communication linking the united
States to the region, 2) limiting China's freedom of action on its southern
border, 3) countering or neutralizing potential developments in U.S.-Japan and
US-Japan -PRC security relations, and 4) facilitating further Soviet
penetration of the southern Asian and Western Pacific regions.81 Militarily,
Moscow's primary objective in the region is to prepare for the contingency of
war against the United States and China. Other military contingencies would
Include a war on the Korean peninsula, Soviet responses to a Chinese invasion
of Vietnam, and punitive cross-border strikes against China.82
China, the only Asian power with nuclear weapons, continues to be
perceived by Moscow as the Soviet's most serious security problem. Trying to
contain China's power and influence is seen as central to Soviet policies in
the region. Donald Zagorla feels that Soviet over-reaction to a perceived
"threat" from China, evidenced in the massive military build-up along the
Sino-Soviet border, "is an example of the kind of Soviet inflexibility that has
proved to be so counterproductive in its foreign relations..." 83 This could
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explain the Soviet failure to check the expansion of China's relationships
with the U.S. and Japan. Zagoria also feels that Soviet attempts to re-
establish their influence in North Korea may be aimed at distracting the U.S.
from building up Its military power in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean and
completing their encirclement of China.84
The Soviet Union has made a considerable effort to attract Japanese
investment in Siberia, but the Japanese remain wary of improving the general
economic strength of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Soviet Union's
Inflexibility on territorial issues and Its military build-up in the vicinity of
Japan has in a large part precluded a warming in relations between the two
countries.
2. Peoples Republic of China (PRO
Tensions between the PRC and the Soviet Union seem to remain strong
despite a resumption of full diplomatic talks between the two countries in
October 1982. There remains, by some estimates, more than one million
heavily armed men along the Sino-Soviet border.
Of particular disappointment to the Soviets, has been the warming of
relations between the PRC and the United States. Since diplomatic relations
between the U.S. and China were restored in 1979, numerous scientific,
cultural, and economic agreements have been reached between the two
countries. These Include agreements that would allow U.S. contractors to bid
on the building of nuclear reactors in China as well as the sale of military
weapons to the PRC. China hopes to use this new relationship to help
modernize its forces to counter the Soviet threat.
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Historically, the PRC has been a friend and ally to North Korea. This
friendship was consolidated when China came to the aid of the DPRK in
October 1 950, when the Korean War began to turn sour for North Korea. When
the 51no-5oviet rift began to widen, both China and the Soviet Union made
concerted efforts to keep North Korea from the other's camp. As a result, the
PRC did not even recognize the ROK as a legitimate government until the early
tomid-1980's.
In 1981, when the Slno-American relations began to deteriorate over
the U.S. arms sale to Taiwan, China began to shore up its relations with
North Korea by sending military and economic aid to Pyongyang. In April
1982, Deng Xiaoping made a secret visit to North Korea which was soon
followed by 40 A-7 aircraft and an export of a million tons of oil to the Kim
regime.85
Recently, however, Beijing has been playing both sides of the Korean
fence. China did not approve of Kim ll-sung's plan for military action against
South Korea in 1975 when Kim discussed this matter with the Chinese in
Beijing. Furthermore, the PRC has disassociated itself with the terrorist
acts of the DPRK. This was particularly true with the Rangoon bombing. As a
result, dialogue between the PRC and South Korea has increased significantly.
It also seems the PRC has recently shown a willingness to pressure North
Korea to take a less rigid approach to reunification and to explore with the
United States and Japan, steps to reduce tensions on the peninsula. The
United States Interests in the region would be significantly enhanced by this
type of shift from the PRC. The United States could use the PRC to set up
four-way talks between themselves, Seoul, and Pyangyang, to achieve these
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reduced tensions. However, official rhetoric by China is that "there is no
change in our policy toward South Korea" and "there will De no change in the
future"86 -
3. japan
Japan recognizes that its access to natural resources, particularly
energy supples, and the maintenance of the sea lanes constitute a survival
interest to them. Nevertheless, due to limitations in the constitution
prohibiting a significant military build-up, they provide only a token defense
of those interests. This token defense consists of a 180,000-man Self
Defense Force which provide only limited coastal protection of its home
islands. However, beginning in 1 969, the Nixon administration began
pressuring Japan to assume a greater role in the preservation of the security
and stability in the Northeast Asian area. The pressure tactics have worked
to a certain extent. Until 1 980, the mission of Japan's Self-Defense Force
(SDF) was restricted to protecting sea lanes a few hundred miles off the
Japanese coast. Their mission was to escort and protect vessels carrying
food, oil and other resources to Japan along two sea lanes, one connecting
Tokyo and Guam, and the other from Osaka to the Bashi Channel, between
Taiwan and the Philippines. SDF defense operations were limited to counter
only a direct threat to Japanese territory. In 1980, Prime Minister Suzuki
pledged to improve Japanese defense capabilites and protect its sea lanes
extending 1 ,000 nautical miles from its coasts. In January 1 983, Prime
Minister Nakasone, further pledged to extend It control of the Japanese
straits to block passage of Soviet ships and submarines and secure sea lines
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of communication to several hundred miles. However, the defense budget of
Japan is still limited to less than one percent of Japan's GNP and according to
current Japanese policy, a direct threat against Japan or against U.S. naval
vessels operating for the defense of Japan remains a prerequisite for Japan's
joint naval operation, including the blocking of the Soya, Tsugaru, and
Tsushima straits with U.S. forces.87 Furthermore, the naval strength of
Japan which includes 49 destroyers and frigates, 14 submarines, and 170
land-based Anti-submarine warfare aircraft, and an Air Force, with only
290 combat aircraft, are not seen as adequate to meet the U.S. expectations
regarding sea-lane defense.88
Another bone of contention that the United States has with Japan
started in December 1967 when Prime Minister Sato announced that Japan
will not "possess, manufacture, or introduce nuclear weapons into its
territory". Though not legally binding, these principles have theoretically
been adhered to under the eyes of anti-nuclear groups. This greatly
complicates American security tactics in the area.
Under strong pressure by President Nixon, a joint Nixon-Sato
communique in November 1969 included a clause that South Korea is
essential to the security of Japan.89 However, historical and cultural
experiences between the two countries makes a close tie extremely difficult.
Deep seeded animosities, tension, and suspicions between the two peoples
are not likely to go away soon. The 1973 kidnapping of Korean dissident Kim
Dae Jung from a Tokyo hotel room, the arrest of two Japanese youths in Seoul
for Inciting a riot, and the discovery that the murder of Mrs. Park In 1974
was the workings of a North Korean group from Tokyo, did little to alleviate
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those tensions. Furthermore, there is a fear In both Japan and South Korea
that any increase in their contribution to East Asian security will provide an
excuse for the U.S. to cut Its troop commitment to Northeast Asia.
However, progress has been made. In 1979, there was an official visit
to Korea by the Director General of the Japanese Defense Agency which was
the first official military contact between the two countries since the end of
the Second World War. In Jauary 1 983, Nakasone became the first Japanese
Prime Minister to make an official to Korea. In September 1984, President
Chun returned his visit In Tokyo. Plans are now in the making for a visit to
Seoul by the Japanese Crown Prince Akihito. This trip, tentatively set for
October 1986, will be the first official visit to Korea by a member of the
Japanese royal family since 1945.
Though the introduction of Japanese ground forces in South Korea Is
nearly out of the question, Edward Olsen suggests other means in which
Japan could work closer with the ROK for the greater security of the region.
These Include Japan giving operational air and naval support near Korea,
technology transfers to the ROK, and more explicit treaty commitments to
the U.S. for the sharing of Intel legence, logistic, and planning data.90
It appears that it is also in the Japanese interest to also shore up its
relations with its communist neighbors. As well as some minor economic
agreements, North Korea and Japan have agreed to sign a pact on sport
exchanges In the spring of 1986. Japan has already been invited to five
international athletic competlons in Pyangyang. In January 1986, Soviet
Foreign Minister Shervardnadze visited Tokyo. This was the first trip of a
Soviet Foreign Minister to Tokyo in over two decades.
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4. UNITED STATES
The United States currently maintains one army division and two
combat air wings in Korea, two-thirds of a marine division in Okinawa, two
combat air wings in Japan, one combat air wing in the Philippines, two
carriers, one battleship, eight submarines, and twenty-one surface
combatants in the Western Pacific basin. 91
United States forces in Korea include the 2d Infantry Division, the
38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, the 4th Missile Command, a full air wing
with components of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing and the 51st Composite
Tactical Wing, the 19th Support Brigade, and small engineer, transportation,
and signal units. One battalion of the 2nd Infantry Division is stationed
north of the Imjin River, close to the DMZ. The remainder is deployed south
with division headquarters at Camp Casey, twenty miles to the rear of the
ROK army positions, but still along the main invasion route from the DMZ to
Seoul. The United States allegedly maintains approximately 650 nuclear
warheads on the Korean peninsula, as well as, the nuclear capability of the
U.S. Seventh Fleet.92
The U.S. has modernized its forces in Korea with the changeout of two
squadrons of F-4s with F- 1 6s, deployment of an A- 10 close air support
squadron, upgrade of gunships and intelligence collection capabilities,
replacement of older model tanks with the M60A3, and deployment of the
Multiple Launch Rocket System.
On several occassions, the United States has had to make a show of
force following North Korean provocations. These provocations include the
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capture of the U55 Pueblo in January 1968 and the subsequent holding of its
82 crew members for eleven months, the shooting down of an American
EC- 121 in April 1969, the brutal axe murders of two American soldiers who
were attempting to cut down a tree In the Joint-security area In August
1976, and the firing of a surface-to-air missile at an American
5R-71 reconnaissance plane flying over international waters in August 1981.
5. Democratic Peoples' Repub lic of Korea (DPRK)
North Korea remains the greatest threat to South Korea's security.
This threat is evidenced In Kim II Sung's procamatlon in 1962 of his four
point military doctrine. This doctrine stressed: 1) cadrlflcation or training
each man to assume combat leadership should the occassion demand, 2)
adapting modern military techniques to local geographical and topographical
conditions, 3) raising a nation in arms in which " the entire people, holding a
weapon In one hand and a sickle in the other, should reliably safeguard our
socialist homeland" and 4) the need to prepare for a protracted struggle in
terms of a program to "build up zones of military strategic importance, to
develop munitions Industry, and to create resources of necessary
materials"94 This threat is manifested in North Korea's massive military
build-up.
North Korea has currently 838,000 active duty personnel in uniform
which includes 750,000 soldiers, 35,000 sailors, and 53,000 Air Force
personnel. In addition, it has 40,000 it its Air Force security reserve force,
40,000 naval reservists, and 500,000 army reservists which can supposedly
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be mobilized within twelve hours. In addition, the DPRK's Workers-Farmers
Red Guard boasts a militia of more than 3 million men and women. Some
700,000 young people make up the Youth Red Guard, in toto, over 5,000,000
men and women have some kind of Reserve or Militia commitment.95
In North Korea, each citizen is a potential soldier, readily mobilized .
The people are socialized to believe that their utmost national task is to
liberate South Korea and to regard their military service as an honor and a
duty. Young people volunteer for the military because it is an expression of
loyalty and ideological fitness and is a fundamental prerequisite for
advancement in North Korean society.
North Koreas's defense expenditures In 1985 amounted to
approximately twenty percent of Its GNP. Its defense Industries have been
producing massive amounts of weapons systems including AK-47 rifles,
mortars, rocket launchers, artillery, anti-aircraft weapons, personnel
carriers, patrol craft, and submarines. They may also be producing tanks and
combat jet aircraft. North Korea maintains along a 120 mile front three-
quarters as many artillery pieces as the U.S. Army has deployed world-
wide.^
Just as critical as the numerics of the North Korean military forces is
how their forces are deployed as how that complicates the defense of the
South Koreans. A March 1986 report by the South Korean Minister of Defense,
Lee Kl-baek, stated that there has been a massive redeployment of North
Korean ground forces within the last 15 months. The reports states that the
front area now encompasses 65% of the DPRK ground forces, up twenty
percent from the previous 15 months. The rear and central areas of North
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Korea have shown a corresponding drop from 15% to 5% and 40% to 30%
respectively.97 This redeployment enhances the DPRK's ability to initiate a
"blitzkrieg" operation deep into the ROK in which they hope to gain a decisive
military advantage in five to seven days.
A report submitted in January 1979 by the Senate Armed Services
Commitee Identified the a build-up along the eastern and western coasts of
North Korea south of the 39th parallel. These troops would either play an In-
between role between a "forward defense" and a "defense-in-depth" strategy
around Pyongyang, or may be for the purpose of opening up another front
somewhere deep into the rear areas of the ROK. The latter would be
accomplished with deployments by submarine, ship, or airlift. Though the
second front idea was not viewed as a feasible plan as late as 1980,
increased naval capability by the North Koreans make this a stronger
possibility.98
Perhaps the greatest threat to South Korea is the nearly 100,000 men
of the North Korean 8th Special Army Group, trained in special warfare
techniques and comprising the largest commando force in the world. These
men, with a large fleet of 280 AN-2 light aircraft and gliders flying under
South Korean radar, provide a deadly suprlse attack option. This attack, if
soon reinforced by North Korean mobile attack forces, breaking across the
DMZ, and by amphibious mechanized units landing on the banks of the Han
River, could strike directly at the heart of the capital city, and paralyze the
nerve center of South Korea's command.99 This surprise attack option has
recently been enhanced by the illicit acquistlon in the spring of 1986 of 87
U.S.-built Hughes 500 helicopters, from a West German firm. These
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helicopters, the same model as the ROK possesses, have been painted with
South Korean markings to mutiply identification difficulties.
The North Koreans have also Duiit 30 airrieids south or Pyongyang, two
new bases being built near the truce area will give their Russian-built
M1g-23's, of which they have 26 and projected to get ten more, a flight time
of only eight minutes to Seoul. Furthermore, the recent transfer of Soviet
5cud-B missiles to North Korea have the range to hit Seoul from Pyongyang.
These aircraft, missiles, and the DPRK"s stockpile of 180-250 metric tons of
chemical weapons, including mustard gas and nerve, round out a very serious
threat to the ROK.
U.S. analysts feel that North Korea could sustain an offensive posture
for about 90 days without the need for outside assistance. A big fear,
however, Is Soviet or Chinese reinforcements which would greatly increase
North Korean sustainabillty. North Korea has had defense treaties with both
the PRC and the Soviet Union since 1961.
A warming of relations with the Soviet Union has been exemplified by
visits to Moscow by Kim ll-5ung and his son, Kim Jong-il, in 1984 and
February 1 986 respectively.
6. Republic of Korea (ROK)
The weaponry, equipment, and organization of the ROK forces are
oriented to a static defense. The South Korean posture is governed by a
"forward-defense" strategy which attempts to halt a Korean advance before
It reaches their capital city of Seoul. Seoul, unfortunately, is only 25 miles
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south of the DMZ and can be shelled directly from the North Korea and
attacked by air in a matter of minutes. This proximity of the South Korean
capital to the DMZ makes its defense extremely difficult.
The South Koreans have focused their defense on two invasion routes
leading to Seoul: the Chorwan Valley from the northeast (route used in the
June 1950 invasion) and the Kaesong-Munsan approach from the northwest.
The fire power that the South Koreans hope to stop the North Koreans with
includes artillery and anti-tank weapons from ROK and U.S. ground forces and
tactical air support from fighters and fighter-bombers based in South Korea,
Japan, the Philippines, and with the Seventh Fleet. Massive air strikes from
B-52 bombers based on Guam are also available. The South Koreans have
established strongpolnts along the invasion routes, mainly on mountain tops
to create bottlenecks. The heaviest concentration of these strongpoints is a
line two to five miles south of the DMZ.
The armed forces of the Republic of Korea, in themselves, are a
powerful and well-organized fighting machine. The largest segment of the
South Korean military is the South Korean army totalling 520,000. South
Korea's First and Third Armies are combat ready, deployed primarily north of
Seoul. The Second Army is primarily a training unit, deployed throughout
South Korea but includes mostly rear divisions. The Air Force with 33,000
men on active duty, is equipped with 451 combat aircraft Including U. 5. built
F-4 Phantoms, F-5 Tigers, and recently deployed F-16's. South Korea also has
23,000 sailors and 22,000 marines making a total of 598,000 active duty
military personnel. In addition, there are 1,400,000 Army Regular
Reservists, 7,000 Navy reservists, 60,000 marine reservists, 55,000 Air
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Force reservists and 3,300,000 in the Homeland Reserve Defense Forces. 100
The Homeland Reserve Defense Forces is a para-military force established in
1 968. It consists of mobilization reserve forces made up of veterans of
active duty service and the general reserve force, a volunteer unit geared to
local defense. Its mission is to reinforce the active duty forces when needed
and provide a behind-the-lines defense for villages and offices.
Article 36 of the 1980 constitution says "All citizens shall have the
duty of national defense in accordance with the provisions of law. 101 With
this in mind, the law requires all males citizens between age 17 and 50,
except those serving in other security organizations, to serve in the Civil
Defense Corps, a parmilitary force organized in 1975. Civil Defense programs
are to be used to cope with possible subversive activities by North Korean
agents. Also in 1975, the Student Corps for National Defense was
established. Under this program, about two million students, male and
female, as well as teachers undergo paramilitary training. The age of
conscription in South Korea was lowered in 1980 to age 19. Compulsory
service with the Army and Marine Corps is thirty months. Service in the Navy
and Air Force is for three years.
Appendix D, E. and F lists the naval, ground, and air forces of selected
nations in the Pacific Basin. 102 Appendix G gives the approximate location as
to where U.S. and Soviet forces are deployed. 103 With the U.S. Seventh Fleet,
the U.S. and its Northeast Asian allies maintain a rough parity with the
rapidly expanding Soviet military power in the region. However, if the trend
continues, the Soviets will soon be able to control the events around the Sea
of Japan should hostilities break out.
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B. CURRENT STRATEGIC I55UE5
1. Security Assistance
One major policy issue that has been getting much attention in the
United States is the sale of military arms and technology to the Republic of
Korea. There has been mounting pressure in Congress to curb arms sales to
South Korea to halt the escalating arms race between North and South Korea
and to prevent a compromise of U.S. military technologies.
Historically, the United States has been a critical arms supplier to
South Korea. The military aid to Korea immediately following the Second
World War was an outgrowth of the Truman Doctrine, under which the United
States provided economic and military assistance to any country faced with
the threat of internal or external communist aggression. President Truman
proclaimed, 104
"The concept of peace for the United States has becomeindistinquishable
from the concept of peace in the world as a whole. American security
and well-being are now dependent upon, and inextricably bound up with,
the security and well-being of free peoples everywhere."
No direct military aid reached South Korea until after the Korean war
started though, appropriations had been approved by Congress under the
October 1949 Mutual Defense Assistance Program and a subsequent
agreement between the two countries in January 1950. 105 Until the outbreak
of the Korean War, U.S. military assistance had been comprised only of M-
1
rifles , machine guns, small mortars, and M-3 105mm howitzers which the
Americans left behind following an U.S. pull-out in 1948.' 06 The inadequacy
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of arms in the South Korean military , according to former Ambassador John
J. Muccio, was due in large part to the fear in the United States that ROK
President Syngman Rhee, if adequately armed, would initiate an attack on the
North Koreans. 107
Viewing the invasion ofSouth Korea by the DPRK on 25 June 1950 as
expansionism of the Soviet Union and international communism, the United
States began providing American combat forces as well as massive military
aid through the Military Assistance Program (MAP). The Mutual Security Act
of 1951 was evidence of a shift In American policy toward military arms and
technology transfers. This act authorized increased amounts of military and
economic assistance to South Korea and other "forward defense areas",
embodying what is considered the U.S. "containment" policy. It was firmly
believed that conventional aid and the threat of "massive retaliation" with
nuclear weapons could prevent the situation in Korea from recurring in other
parts of the world.
For compensation of a United States' pull-out following the Korean War,
the U.S. began pouring considerable resources into the South Korean economy
as well as in their military. Major weapon exports to South Korea grew
steadily throughout the fifties and reached a peak between 1958 and I960. 108
However, most of these arms exports were surplus, obsolete, and second-
hand World War II equipment. 109 President Kennedy's change from a strategy
of "massive retal nation" to a strategy of "flexible response" meant a renewed
focus on conventional weaponry and a reappraisal of the United States
military aid to its "forward defense areas". American aid began
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concentrating on the training and equipping of indigenous forces to counter
communist threats.
The Vietnam War was a watershed In the modernization of the ROK
armed forces and the transfer of arms and military assistance to South
Korea. As a quid pro quo for the deployment of two combat division from
South Korea to South Vietnam, the United States significantly increased its
military assistance to the ROK. In 1965, the United States provided eighty-
five percent of the total joint R0K-U5 expenditures on defense. Large
amounts of artillery, tanks, small arms, patrol crafts, and other
miscellaneous equipment arrived from the United States. Nike- Hercules and
Hawk air defense systems were provided in 1965 and 1966. F-5 Freedom
Fighters began replacing the F-86's. In 1969, the United States provided
anti-aircraft systems, fast patrol boats, radar, two helicopters, additional
F-5A fighter aircraft, and a squadron ( 1 9) of F-4E Phantoms, to counter the
recent acquisitions of M1G -21 fighters by North Korea. 110 In addition, the
United States loaned South Korea two more destroyers in 1968 and 1969
which made a total of three. In response to a 1 969 request by the ROK
Defense Minister for two million rifles and small arms to equip the Homeland
Defense Reserve Force (HRDF), the United States shipped 790,000 surplus
weapons, including M-ls, M-l and M-2 carbines, and M-3 5M6s with
accompanying ammunition, and repair parts. 111
Richard Nixon brought an end to the policy of "flexible response" when
he proclaimed the Nixon Doctrine in 1969 with the following words: 112
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" we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested
in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the
nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of
providing the manpower for its defense."
This policy led to the advocation in the United States of more arms transfers
to our allies in order to meet the responsibility of defending themselves.
This paved the way for the underwriting of a large part of the South Korean
military modernization program. On 22 October 1 970, Melvin Laird
declared, 113
"The U.S. Military Assistance Program and the U.S. Foreign Military
Sales Program serve as key instruments in the implementation of the
Nixon Doctrine."
in 1971, the ROK launched Its 5-year Force Modernization Program. In
support of this program, the United States sent in 1971, eighteen F-4D
fighters, fifty M048 tanks, armored personnel carriers, heavy artillery,
twelve Honest John surface-to-air missiles; a $95 million package under
MAP. In addition, the ROK received fifty M-60 main battle tanks left behind
by the U.S. 7th Infantry Division when the division was fully redeployed in
1971. 114
By the completion of South Korea's 5-year Force Moderlzation Program,
the U.S. had contributed $1.3 billion In military assistance. Table four
displays a breakdown on this assistance. 1 15
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HAP (1971-75). FMSCedM 1974-75) Total
Aircraft $235, 658 $19,300 $254,958
Ships 30,853 7,800 38,653
Vehicles/weapons 196,128 6,900 203,028
Ammunition 37,478 2,200 39,678
Missiles 10,090 40,300 50,390
Comm equipment 40,234 21,000 61,234
Misc equip 93,065 1 1 ,683 104,748
Rehab and repair 16,148 6,500 22,648
Supply operations 90,187 90,187
Training 14,736 14,736
Other services 10.101 10.101
Total 774,678 115,683 890,361
U.S. Security Assistance to South Korea Under the FMP ($Thousands)
Table 4
In 1975, South Korea launched its Force Improvement Plan (FIP), a
follow-up to its 5-year Force Modernization Program, and began increasing
its amount of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits with the United States.
By 1976, FMS credits totaled $260 million on FMS orders totalling $616
million.
Between 1975 and 1977, South Korea acquired or ordered through FMS
credit, fifty-four F-5E and six F-5F fighter with ground equipment and ten
spare engines, nineteen F-4E and eighteen F-4D aircraft Phantom fighters,
120 Harpoon ship-to-ship missiles with twelve launchers, twenty-four
Rockwell OV-10 recce/night obervation aircraft, ten AH-1J helicopter
gunships, three Improved Hawk battalions, forty Standard missiles, 1000 TOW
missiles, and five mobile radar systems. Lance surface-to-surface missiles
began replacing Honest John and Sergeant missile systems. 116
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Security assistance to South Korea continues to be of vital interest to
the United States, It goal as stated in a congressional committee for
security assistance report on 1 April 1986, 117
" the security assistance programs in South Korea are to improve air
defense capability to counter North Korea Mig-23 procurement, to
enhance the ability of South Korea to defend against low flying, high
performance aircraft, to provide added armor capability to respond to
increased mechanized threat, to promote standardization and inter-
operability of U.S. andf South Korean forces, to increase Korean war
reserve material stocks, and to enhance management capabilities of
Korean forces."
Toward this end, the United States agreed to sell the ROK 30 F- 1 6A's
(plus 6 F16B's for trainers). Delivery of these weapon systems started in
early 1986. Other recent arms transfers include Stinger and Redeye surface-
to-air missiles as well as sophisticated radar for low-altitude detection.
Other security assistance has included recent Congressional approval to
add $360 million of reserve stock to the allied stockpile in South Korea in
1986. The administration is also seeking an increase of Foreign Military
Sales credits to South Korea for FY 87 to $230 million. 118
Security Assistance to the Republic of Korea has been instrumental in
perservlng peace In the region since the Korean War and crucial to the
development of the ROK military Into a top-notch fighting machine. Appendix
H summarizes this military assistance. 119 However, we cannot
afford to stop here. Arms sales should be continued as they serve the
United States" national interest In the following ways:
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1. Stability in the Region
Security Assistance to the ROK counters the rapid development of the
North Korean military and helps maintain stability in the region. Since
the Korean conflict in 1950, there has been considerable concern by the
United States that another such conflict could ignite. The United
States would undoubtedly be drawn in and there is speculation that the
Soviet Union and the PRC would also be drawn in. A confrontation
between the nuclear powers must be avoided at all cost. A strong
stable Korean military could prevent such a scenario.
2. Influence in the Region
The ROK has become a major economic and political influence in the
region. A strong tie betwen the United States and South Korea is
essential in order for the United States to affect that influence. The
United States cannot depend on Japan alone, limited by its size,
resources, and military capability, to affect the strategic and political
affairs of Asia. The United States must look toward other nations as
well. Arms transfers to South Korea provide an excellent opportunity
for such a diversification.
3. Economic Benefits
Many defense Industries in the United States would benefit
tremendously from the profits derived from the arms sales.
Employment at the defense plants would be maintained at higher levels
with Korean markets available.
4 Foreign Policy Statement
Security assistance indicate a continuing improvement in the United
States and ROK relations. It sends a signal to North Korea, the Soviet
Union, and China, that South Korea is an ally and as such, the United
States will not tolerate any aggression toward them.
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5. Counter Soviet Expansionism .
The concerted effort of the Soviet Union to expand militarily in the
Pacific basin must be countered. The modernization of the military
forces in the ROK provides a means. Even the Soviets, recognizing
the South Koreans as a military power, must tread softly in the region.
6. Domestic Political Considerations
The inability of the South Korean government to convince the populace
that they are safe from a perceived threat from North Korea could cause
considerable political instability in the country. This instability would
jeopardize the interests of the United States.
7. Nuclear Threat
Strengthening the conventional forces of the ROK lessens the possibility
of having to cross the nuclear threshold to ward off a North Korean
attack, should deterrence fail. In addition, the danger of nuclear
proliferation of the ROK is minimized.
8. Troop Strength
A strong Korean military makes it possible to lessen the costly U.S.
military presence on the peninsula. Communist forces on the entire
Korean peninsula would threaten vital strategic Interests of the United
States. It must be defended. As Claude Buss puts it talking about
American aid packages, "In enabling the ROK to defend itself, the
United States was saving the American taxpayer from defending the
ROK" 120 The same idea holds for security assistance today.
Nevertheless, the United States must not approach arms transfers with
a blind eye. Arms transfers to the Korean peninsula are critical but United
States' security interests are not limited to the Korean peninsula or
Northeast Asia. The United States must provide security assistance to a
large number of countries and thus should not give beneficial loan rates in
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favor of South Korea which decrease the revenue of the U.S. Federal Reserve
Bank.
The tight grip on South Korean arms exports to third-world countries is
currently one of biggest areas of conflict between the U.S. and the ROK. Let's
examine why. The American disengagement policy under the Nixon Doctrine,
subsequent troop withdrawal, and bold North Korean provocations, led the
South Korean government to embark on the building up of its defense industry
to achieve self-sufficiency In basic combat equipment. The ROK began an
ambitious program to restructure its domestic Industries in the direction of
capital and technology intensive Industries which have defense applications.
Furthermore, the ROK provided a wide variety of incentives to defense
contractors.
Highly successful under its Force Modernization Plan (1971-75) and two
phases of the Force Improvement Plan (1976-86), the South Korean industrial
sector has been able to produce a wide range of conventional weapons,
aircraft, armored vehicles, missiles, and naval vessels. However, the defense
industries in South Korea have fallen victim to their own success. The
domestic markets for defense goods have been saturated and the utilization
rate of defense industrial plants has fallen to 48 percent. Between 1980 and
1984, six defense contractors have gone bankrupt. Nine others capitulated in
1 985. Exports of arms to third-world countries seems to be a viable
solution for South Korean industries but problems are present.
Global recession, debt crisis, and the oil glut have driven all developing
countries to take fiscal austerity measures which has taken a toll on the
South Korean arms export market. However, by far, South Korean arms
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exporters have Deen hurt most Dy the restraints the united States places on
them. Most of the military hardware currently produced In the ROK results
from the acquisition of defense services and technical data from the United
States. The United States' Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the
international Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) strictly restrain the sale of
defense articles produced with United States' assistance, technical data,
manufacturing licenses, or coproduction to third countries. ITAR specifically
states thatJ2i
"The technical data or defense service exported from the United States
in furtherance of this agreement and any defense articles which may be
produced or manufactured from such technical data or defense service
may not be transferred to a person in a third country except as
specifically authorized in this agreement unless the prior written
approval of State Department has been obtained."
This severely restricts ROK defense exporters. Written permission is a long
tedious process which begins with a petition from the South Korean Ministry
of Defense to the Joint Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) who sends it to the
American Embassy in Seoul who in turn passes it on the
U.S. State Department and the Department of Defense. The State Department's
Office of Security Assistance and Sales and Bureau of Political and Military
Affairs become the key action offices on the request. However, the Office of
Munitions Control, the Human Rights Bureau, the Korean desk in the State
Department, the Defense Security Assistance Agency, International Security
Affairs, the sales assistance divisions of the individual military services,
and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency all get a crack at it. With high
dollar value request, the US Congress, the National Security Council, and the
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Arms Export Control Board are also involved. 122 Currently, forty-two Korean
defense articles require prior written approval prior to export.
Until lately, South Korea has been faithful in complying the U.S.
regulations restricting their arms exports but pressures have been mounting
within South Korea to cheat. South Korea has recently shown up on an
Department of Defense Inspector General's report as one of the countries
taking advantage of U.S. supplied technical information, intended for use in
maintaining previously supplied equipment, to produce replicas for sale to
third-world countries. The report states that the Korean Defense
Procurement Agency's military catalog "advertises an array of military
equipment" which "resembles U.S.-designed equipment" and even uses "U.S.
Army model designations in their advertising literature" aimed at sales to
nations that already use U.S. type equipment. 123
Identical to U.S. products, increases in South Korea's third-world arms
sales directly results in a decrease in U.S. arms exports. Therefore, the
transfer of technologies and the permission to export arms manufactured
with U.S. technologies must be tightly controlled. However, a proper balance
must be found. Military exports are critically linked to the health of South
Korea's national economy as the defense sector has become an integral part
of the heavy, shipbuilding, metallic, and electronics industries. Failure in
this sector could trigger a social and political trauma which in turn could
undermine the transition to democracy in South Korea as well as their
national security. Furthermore, continued underutilization of defense
production facilites and the potential collaspe of defense contractors mean a
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weakened defense industrial base. The maintenance of a optimal level of
production during peacetime is vital to strategic preparedness in war.
This is not to imply a leniency in permission granted to export, but between
1981 and 1982, the United States only approved three percent of South
Korean requests for arms exports. In 1983, only eight percent and in 1984,
2.8 percent. This is in addition to a eight percent royalty fee imposed on all
export items of U.S. origin. Less restraint would go far far in improving U.S.-
Korean relation, stabilize the defense sector of the Korean economy, and
remove some of the incentive for "bootlegging" American technologies.
2. Troop Withdrawal
The troop withdrawal issue is certainly one of the most sensitive
issues in the U.S.-Korean security relationship. Most South Koreans identify
the presence of the U.S. ground forces with the U.S. commitment to peace and
security on the Korean peninsula. The South Koreans feel that the presence of
U.S. ground forces are essential to overcome what they see as weaknesses in
the Mutual Defense Treaty.
The Mutual Defense Treaty which was signed on October 1, 1953 and
ratified November 18, 1954, states that the ROK and the United States accept
the right to dispose U.S. land, air, and sea forces in and about the territory of
the ROK as determined by mutual agreement. The South Koreans understand
the U.S. has the right, not the obligation to dispose these forces. That's what
scares them. The Mutual Defense Treaty does not guarantee a joint action
against an armed attack. Article III of the treaty states that each country
considers an external attack in the Pacific on territories under their
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respective administrative control " would be dangerous to its own peace and
safety" and declares that they would "act to meet the common danger in
accordance with its constitutional processes." 124 The Koreans wanted the
United States to commit to an automatic response in case of an attack, but
the clause, "in accordance with its constitutional processes", was not
changed. In addition, an "understanding" was Included with the treaty that
stated that the treaty was only applicable if an external armed attack was
directed against the ROK. This was to ensure the American Congress that the
treaty was not applicable if the ROK launched an Invasion against the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). What frightens the South
Koreans is North Korea launching an indirect invasion and Americans, not
agreeing on the nature of the attack, failing to support them. Therefore,
they feel the presence of American ground forces deployed along the likely
invasion routes, fs the next best thing to guarantee a U.S. response. This
"tripwire" of the American soldiers is considered the major deterrent against
a DPRK invasion. What Hubert H. Humphrey said in 1966 is very much as
applicable today, "As long as there is one American soldier on the line of the
border, the demarcation line, the whole and entire power of the United States
of America is commited to the security and defense of Korea" 125
United States forces on the Korean peninsula serves United States
national interest. They defend South Korea from North Korean aggression,
strengthen the cause of freedom and democracy in Northeast Asia, counter
Soviet expansionism, and maximizes U.S. influence in the region. Troop
withdrawal would raise doubts about the extent of the U.S. commitment
which would adversely affect U.S. security interests. Secretary of State
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Kissinger's promise in 1976 that the united States "will not undermine
stability and hopes for negotiation by withdrawing forces unilaterally." 126
should still be adhered to.
In the Spring of 1 977, President Carter began plans, as he had
promised In his Presidential campaign, to withdraw U.S. ground forces from
South Korea. Policy Review Memoranda 13 contained various arguments for
his troop withdrawal plan. On 5 nay 1977, Carter initiated that plan via
Presidential Decision 12 which would have removed the U.S. 2nd Infantry
Division from Korea by 1 982. The first 6,000 troops were to be withdrawn
by the end of 1978 and the final 26,000 by the end of 1982. The reasons for
Carter's plan included: 1) giving the U.S. more flexibility in a response to an
invasion by the DPRK, 2) a desire to cut the defense budget, 3) a response to
domestic pressure to reduce American military forces abroad, both in Europe
and Asia, 4) to force the ROK to become truly independent and rid Itself of
dependence upon the U.S. for its defense, and 5) to punish South Korea for
human rights violations that Carter felt were deplorable.
Major General John K. Singlaub, Chief of Staff, United States Forces
Korea, felt it was a mistake to remove the American forces unilaterally
without at least seeking some sort of concession form the DPRK. He felt that
a withdrawal would Invite a North Korean Invasion and lead to war. 127
President Carter's withdrawal plan sent a shock wave throughout the
American allies in Asia who were never consulted about the plan and who
felt this was another failure of the United States to live up to their
commitments. The American Congress was not even forewarned of the plan.
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In April 1978, President Carter, feeling the pressure from Congress
and abroad, announced a change in his withdrawal schedule reducing the
initial reduction from 6,000 to 2,600 troops. Only one combat battalion would
be removed instead of the entire brigade. An intelligence reassessment of
ROK and DPRK capabilities began in the summer of 1978 by the Defense
Intelligence Agency and the House Select Committee on Intelligence and
ended in 1979. Their report placed the entire withdrawal plan in jeopardy.
It concluded that the DPRK had achieved a numerical superiority on the ground
as well as in the air. It revealed that DPRK divisions had increased from a
projected 29 in 1977 to 37 in 1979 and the number of tanks and armored
personnel carriers had grown 35% and 20% respectively. On 20 July 1 979,
Carter announced that his withdrawal plan was being held in "abeyance".
The Reagan administration reaffirmed a U.S. comlttment to the Korean
peninsula. The administration's first major state visitor to the White House
was President Chun. A joint-communique issued following this meeting made
It clear that the U.S. believed South Korea's security was crucial to peace in
Northeast Asia and even to the security of the United States itself.
It is in the national interest of the United States to maintain ground
forces on the Korean peninsula for the following reasons:
1. The presence of U.S. military ground forces, particularly with one
battalion positioned in a very vulnerable position north of Seoul near
the DMZ, would without a doubt involve the U.S. in a conflict.
Kim ll-Sung recognizes this "tripwire" and thus it serves as an
unequivocal deterrent to North Korean aggression.
2. The presence of U.S. ground forces exerts an enormous psychological
impact on the South Koreans. They recognize the importance of the
U.S. military. They recognize that the U.S.-Korean Mutual Defense
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Treaty does not bind the United States to commit military forces in
their behalf. Therefore, actual troop presence plays a considerable
role in alleviating much of the fear that surround them. As Claude
Buss points out, "In the Korean view, one soldier is worth twenty
speeches, and the physical presence of American troops comforts and
strengthens South Korea." 128 As a result, the quality of life in South
Korea is better.
3. The United States needs to recognize the limitations of the Korean
economy. It still has many structural weaknesses and is not yet
firmly established. In addition, the ROK already spends 6-7% of its
GNP for defense. Massive increases in military spending to offset
the U.S. withdrawal could do great harm to South Korean economic
stability. Economic instablity brews political and social discontent.
Political dissention in Korea, as we have seen in its recent past,
often brings chaos; possibly the opportunity Kim ll-Sung is waiting
for.
4 United States troops are essential to prevent a predominant
influence of the Soviet Union in the Pacific Basin. If the entire
Korean peninsula would come under Soviet influence in a victory by
Kim ll-Sung, the Soviet Union could use Pusan, Chinhae, andXheju
Island as naval bases and many of South Korean airfields for its land-
based aircraft. The Korean Strait could no longer be used to bottle
.
up the Russian fleet in the Sea of Japan. Japan itself would be
threatened.
There is no alternative to the presence of U.S. ground forces in Korea
until South Korea is capable of sustaining deterrence and self-defense on its
own which has been estimated by the South Korean Defense Minister to be in
the early 1990's. At that time, U.S. troops could be pulled out without
disrupting the stability of the area. Should the ROK request a withdrawal at
that time and the U.S. feels the international milieu warrants, the U.S. Second
Division should be withdrawn leaving enough personnel to maintain logistics
lines should a reintroduction of U.S. ground forces be necessary. U.S. air and
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naval forces should remain for a time following the withdrawal of ground
forces to insure continued stability. Their withdrawal would depend on a
revaluation of United States Interests In the region.
United States strategic interests in the Republic of Korea are reaching
a critical juncture. U.S. military intelligence analysts suggest that the next
two or three years will be one of the most dangerous on the peninsula as the
DPRK may want to make a hostile move toward the south before their
weapons become obsolete and before South Korean forces can reach parity
with their own. Some experts feel that a disruption of the Asian or Olympic
games with terrorist activities against a major public or sports facility,
could create the conditions favorable for such an an action.
96
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States national interests around the globe are to protect its
territory from its enemies, to promote a world order in its favor, to secure
economic prosperity by promoting trade, and to maintain Free World
democratic values and ideology. United States national interests in the
Republic of Korea have a varying importance, ranging from vital to peripheral,
calulated upon its contribution to these interests as the international milieu
changes.
Peace and stability on the Korean peninsula are of vital importance to
the maintenance of these interests as the security interests of three nuclear
nations and Japan meet there. A regional conflict there could ignite an
outbreak between superpowers and escalate into a nuclear confrontation.
The primary threat to this peace and stability is the fanatical regime of
Kim ll-Sung. The U.S. must do what it must to prevent war between these
two nations and if that fails to insure that the victory goes to our ally, the
ROK. As Claude Buss puts it, "the geographical location of Korea makes it far
too vital to be in the hands of an unsympathetic power. 130 The best means for
this is for the U.S. to maintain troop presence on the peninsula until the ROK
military has reach parity with the DPRK. This has been estimated at around
1990. Second, the United States must continue to offer security assistance
to the ROK in the form of Foreign Military Credit Sales. Additional close air
support aircraft such as the A- 10 would bolster ROK anti-tank defenses.
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Third, peace and stability can be further promoted by the continued emphasis
of "burden" sharing and military cooperation by our Asian allies. To facilitate
this, the U.S. must convince our allies that their increased "burden" would in
no way lessen the responsibility or the commitment of the United States in
the region. An integration of South Korean and Japanese military forces could
afford protection of the sea approaches to Japan from Soviet submarine and
air attacks. Korea could be responsible for closing the western half of the
Tsushima strait (Korean Strait to the Koreans) which is approximately 100
miles wide. ROK Air Forces in southern Korea could be responsible for
covering the sea lanes against Soviet Backfire attacks. These missions must
however not detract from the primary mission of defending against the North
Korean threat. Fourth, confidence building measures between Seoul and
Pyangyang must be pursued.
The maintenance of a strong Korean economy is a major U.S. interest as
it is closely tied with Korean national security. Economic chaos would
certainly destabilize the government which could in turn encourage
adventurism from the North Korean regime. American business and trade
interests in South Korea are U.S. national interests for the continued well-
being of the American people. These interests are growing and they may
become as vital as those of Japan by the turn of the century.
The United States has a major interest in North-South dialogue. The
success of talks depends on a well coordinated strategy toward North Korea.
Every effort must be made by South Korea and its allies to institute detente
between the North and South. Economic, parlimentary, and Red Cross talks,
must be encouraged as contact and cooperation would be instrumental in
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easing tensions In the region. However, the United States must maintain the
position that it will not deal directly with North Korea except with the full
and equal participation of the the South Korean government.
The United States has a peripheral interest In a constitutional reform
favoring a direct election of their president and support of human rights in
the ROK. Our own values necessitate that we press for democratic reforms in
all countries around the globe but certainly not to the extent that we would
jeopardize our relationship with the ROK government which would in turn
jeopardize our vital national interest in the area.
Perhaps the best way to present U.S. national interests in the framework
presented in chapter one would be in the following table:





Stability of Korean Economy X





UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTEREST IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Table 5
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The United States must keep In mind that in the pursuance If
Interests, there will be tensions among nations, friend and foe alike. A tacit
understanding of the other's society is critical in alleviating those tensions
for the mutual benefit of all concerned.
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Japan 20,966 21,894 23,575 +7.7%
E. Asian NIC's* 15,563 16,914 17,722 +4.8%





Japan 39,932 43,559 60,373 +38.6%
E.Asian NIC's* 23,768 29,560 39,135 +32.4%
PRC 2,502 2,476 3,381 +36.6%
* Taiwan, Hong Kong, Sinapore, and South Korea
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census
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UNITED STATES TRADE WITH JAPAN AND EAST ASIAN NIC's
U.S. Merchandise Trade with Japan, 1980-1984 '
(Domestic and foreign exports, f.a.s.; General imports, c.i.f.)
(Millions of dollars)
ExDorts 2/ Imc orts
Manufactured Products Manufactured Products
Agricul-
tural High Auto- High Auto-
tout Products Total Tech motive Total Total Tech motive
1980 20,790 6, 117 8,871 4,029 208 32.961 32.192 7,748 12.411
1981 . 21,823 6,570 9.992 4,815 189 39,904 39,188 10,616 13,976
1982 • -. 20,966 5,551 9,912 4,763 198 39,932 39,225 11 .127 14,222
1983 21,894 6,246 10,716 5,581 206 43.559 42,680 14,276 16.357
1984 . 23,575 6,762 11 ,917 6,112 247 60,372 59,300 21 ,935 20.213
1983 4,751 1 ,362 2,234 1 ,102 43 9.842 9,632 2,979 3,819
2. 5,204 1 ,398 2,568 1 ,414 49 10,390 10.173 3,362 4,045
3. 5,513 1,520 2,588 1 ,367 50 10,748 10.529 3,596 3,873
4. 6,133 1 ,966 3,032 1 ,698 64 12,579 12,347 4,339 4,621
1984 1. 5,645 1 ,767 2,737 1 ,370 62 13,742 13.477 4.899 4,625
2 5,806 1 .703 2,867 1 ,535 59 14.837 14,580 5,260 5,266
3. 5,769 1 ,480 2,872 1.533 60 17,199 16,918 6,404 5.553
4 5,953 1 ,812 3,039 1 .673 65 14.593 14,325 5,372 4,769
1/ Manufactured goods include SITC 5-8 and special category exports in SITC 9.
II Includes military grant aid shipments. Special category exports are included only in annual
Source: U.S. Department Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
U.S. Merchandise Trade with East Asian NICs, 1980-1984 '
(Domestic and foreign exports, f.a.s.; General imports, c.i.f.)
(Millions of dollars)
E«pgr ts 2/ ImDorts
Manufactured
Agricul -
Pr oducts Manufactured Products
tural High High Textiles
IfiUl Products Total l£Ci!_ lata! loial l£Ch_ App 3 rel
1980 14
,
741 3,468 9,834 4 ,494 18.805 17, 774 4.648 4.8321981 15.059 3,738 9,678 4,285 22,058 20.962 5,435 5.6181982 15,563 3,289 10.448 4.48! 23.768 22,668 5.813 5,9861983 16.914 3,664 1 1
.
125 5,659 29,560 28,309 8.119 6,9921984 17.722 3,672 1 1 ,807 6,337 39. 135 37,648 11
,
107 9,274
1983 3, 744 804 2,370 1 ,224 6.228 5,935 1 ,589 1 ,552
I. 4.418 950 2,883 1 .628 6.842 6,472 1 .859 1 ,675
i. 3,914 856 2.582 1 ,334 8, 130 7,826 2. 124 2,037
4
. 4.283 1 ,055 2. 736 1,473 8, 360 8.076 2,548 1 ,728
1984 1
. 4,043 1 .001 2,598 1 ,385 9,071 8,690 2,589 2, 160
2. 4.486 917 2,952 1 .593 9,292 8,895 2.655 2,084
1. 4,260 824 2,808 1 .489 11.531 11
.
139 3. 136 2 ,918
4 . 4,565 929 3,081 1 .870 9.241 8,924 2.727 2,112
data
1/ Manufactured goods include SITC 5-8 and special category exports in SITC 9V Includes miliary grant aid shipments. Special category exports are included only in annual dad
Source: U.S. Department of Cormerce. Bureau of the Census.
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KOREAN TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES
Total ExDorts to U.S. Total Imoorts from U.S.
ExDorts Amounts % Share ImDorts Amounts % Share
961 40.9 6.9 16.3 316.1 143.3 45.4
962 548 12.0 21.9 421.7 220.3 52.2
963 86.8 24.3 28.0 560.3 284.1 50.7
964 1 19.1 36.6 30.7 404.4 202.1 50.0
965 175.1 61.7 35.2 46.4 182.3 39.3
966 250.3 95.8 38.3 716.4 253.7 35.4
967 320.2 137.4 42.9 996.2 305.2 30.6
968 455.4 237.0 52.0 1462.9 449.0 30.7
969 622.5 315.7 50.7 1823.6 530.2 29.1
970 835.2 395.2 47.3 1 984.0 584.8 29.5
971 1067.6 531.8 49.8 2394.3 678.3 28.3
972 1624.1 759.0 46.7 2522.0 647.2 25.7
973 3225.0 1021.2 31.7 4240.3 1201.9 28.3
974 4460.4 1 492.
1
33.5 6851.8 1700.8 24.8
975 5081.0 1536.3 30.2 7274.4 1881.1 25.9
976 7715.3 2492.5 32.2 8773.6 1962.9 22.4
977 10,046.5 3118.6 31.0 10,810.5 2447.4 22.6
978 12,710.6 4058.3 31.9 14,971.9 3043.0 20.3
979 15,051.5 4348.1 28.9 20,296.1 4189.4 22.6
980 17,483.3 4427.7 26.3 22,282.2 442 1 .2 20.6
981 21,249.7 5469.5 26.6 26,028.3 5008.2 19.2
982 21853.9 6002.9 27.5 24,250.8 5332.6 22.0
983 24,445.0 7649.2 31.3 26,192.0 5709.6 21.8
984 29,150.0 N/A N/A 26,200.0 N/A N/A
985 30,200.0 10721 35.5 N/A 6500.0 N/A
Sources: KIEI Special Report No .41. March 1981
.
1983 International Trade Statistics Yearbook
Korea Herald. 2 Feb 1986
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